Denys Proshyn
| Viktor Nikoliuk | Oksana Marukhlenko* | Oksana Kuzmenko | Maksym Kryvonos
© 2026 The authors. This article is published by IIETA and is licensed under the CC BY 4.0 license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
OPEN ACCESS
The study analyses the integration of the experience of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) into the mechanisms for implementing Ukraine’s public security policy under martial law. The aim of the study was to identify the principles of public security, determine the level of integration of Euro-Atlantic standards into domestic management mechanisms during martial law. The methodological framework of the study is a comparative analysis of legal regimes and security institutions, graphical analysis. The calculation of the EII using indicator normalization and Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation was used as the key method. The components of regulatory and legal harmonization, institutional capacity, operational and tactical integration, and socio-territorial stability were taken into account for the assessment. The results of the study (EII, which is 0.67) showed that Ukraine has achieved a high level of integration of the security experience of the EU and NATO. This indicates progress in regulatory adaptation, institutional development and civil-military cooperation. At the same time, problem areas were identified, in particular, insufficient social stability and the risks of excessive centralization of power in wartime, which can weaken democratic oversight and create prerequisites for corrupt practices.
public security, European Union, North Atlantic Alliance, governance, vulnerability, public policy, martial law
Ukraine is currently facing an unprecedented challenge to national security caused by the full-scale Russian aggression that began in February 2022. The armed confrontation has changed the security system of Europe and forced Ukraine to balance between maintaining democratic governance and ensuring national survival under martial law. In addition to traditional military operations, the conflict has unfolded in the information field accompanied by continuous disinformation [1]. The human dimension of public security has also been significantly affected. The civilian population faces serious mental health problems due to constant shelling and disruptions in the provision of essential services [2].
The imperative for modern countries is to maintain and strengthen public security, ensure the continuity of state functions and preserve democratic stability, while being in a state of full-scale war. This requires strategic integration of external experience. The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) membership aspirations necessitate aligning national public security policies with Euro-Atlantic standards under martial law.
In 2024, the number of armed conflicts increased to 61, and the number of wars reached 11 - the highest figure since 2016 [3]. Based on the needs of ensuring public security, countries see different points of view on the types of tasks of global institutions, but the main disagreement concerns the approach to their implementation. Great powers support an expanded role for global institutions in resolving armed conflicts, provided that national sovereignty is respected [4]. Researchers examine regulatory and economic constraints, and identify best practices for strengthening defence capabilities and public safety.
The success and integrity of EU- and NATO-supported security sector reform (SSR) based on democratic governance are challenged by the martial law. Ukraine is actively pursuing comprehensive reforms, with significant support from the EU and NATO, aimed at bringing its security sector into line with Euro-Atlantic standards that emphasize democratic oversight, the rule of law, and transparency [5]. However, the martial law creates conditions that weaken oversight mechanisms, create opportunities for corruption, and limit transparency. Real integration of EU and NATO experience into the public security policies of European countries requires continued efforts to protect and adapt democratic principles and transparency under martial law.
The academic novelty is the creation of an integral Experience Integration Index (EII). It quantitatively measures the level of implementation of EU and NATO standards in the mechanisms of implementation of public security policy of Ukraine during martial law. This study proposes a unique methodology integrating regulatory harmonization, institutional capacity, operational integration, and socio-territorial stability. The study puts forward a hypothesis that the integration of EU and NATO standards into the mechanisms of implementation of public security policy of Ukraine during martial law is possible even under democratic restrictions. This study operationalizes integration as a systems engineering problem, treating public security policy as the architectural design of critical infrastructure resilience. Consequently, the EII functions as an algorithmic model to quantify the structural integrity of domestic governance mechanisms against Euro-Atlantic security engineering standards.
The aim of the research is to identify the principles and assess the level of integration of EU and NATO experience and standards in the field of public security in the face of an armed conflict. The aim involves the fulfilment of the following research objectives:
The academic value of the study is the application of an indicator (index) that quantifies the level of implementation of EU and NATO standards in the public security system during martial law. The proposed approach provides a single assessment methodology that allows for a comprehensive analysis of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The proposed model has practical applicability for use in further analytical activities and academic research.
2.1 The dichotomy of public security and democratic governance
Academic discourse rigorously evaluates the institutional friction between military expediency and democratic constraints. Researchers emphasize the risks of the legal system and the threat of certain wartime practices that limit democratic development [6]. This exposes a structural contradiction with NATO studies [7, 8], which firmly demand democratic governance and transparency as key conditions for Ukraine’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. A comparison of these positions demonstrates that the immediate needs of military decisions directly conflict with long-term democratic principles. Furthermore, structural analyses dissect the historical vulnerabilities of the state. Previous Ukrainian practices focused mainly on internal threats, which critically weakened the country’s defense potential by 2014 [9]. Conversely, an alternative scholarly perspective [10] proves that the root of the problem lies in the fragmentation of the security doctrine, which degenerated into normative inconsistency. Consequently, scholars attribute the crisis either to structural shortcomings of the public administration system or to the inherently ineffective organizational priorities of the state. Addressing the broader European security architecture after 2022, research [11] exposes integration challenges and the destructive impact of geopolitical processes. In contrast, another study [12] proposes an internally oriented framework, dictating the necessity for goal setting, predictive modelling, and long-term planning of the defense and security sector. This conceptual divergence juxtaposes external integration challenges against internal strategic management mechanisms, yet scholars universally agree on the need for systematicity and predictability as non-negotiable conditions for a successful security policy.
2.2 Environmental and regional dimensions of resilience
A critical paradigm links public safety directly with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the green economy, capturing specific regional and national contexts [13]. This approach introduces a complementary perspective, cementing the ecological and economic foundations of sustainability as a contrast to the predominantly military-political vision of NATO and the EU. The potential for synergy is substantial, as the sustainability of infrastructure and the environment fundamentally dictates social stability. Simultaneously, the regional dimension of public safety acts as a catalyst for resilience. The study [14] demonstrates sharp disproportionality among the regions of Ukraine, operationalizing innovative potential as a core competitive advantage. This local focus intersects with the framework of the European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) [5], which targets law enforcement reform and institutional capacity building. EUAM Ukraine’s mandate encompasses strengthening the rule of law, developing integrated border management, and facilitating accountability for international crimes. Yet, European initiatives strictly operate on a “top-down” principle, whereas Ukrainian researchers champion local innovation capacity. The regional spillover of the conflict severely alters neighboring environments. The psychological state of Romanian society is significantly deteriorating due to proximity to active hostilities and fears of the conflict transforming into a large-scale confrontation with the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. These anxieties directly diminish the general well-being of citizens, demanding enhanced public security [15].
2.3 Institutional models of crisis response: EU vs. NATO
Current academic discourse radically expands the public security paradigm to institutionalize resilience, civil protection, and essential service provision [12, 13]. From a systems engineering perspective, public security is heavily contingent on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Recent advancements in safety engineering emphasize the integration of cyber-physical systems and automated risk assessment models to prevent cascading failures in municipal infrastructure [16]. Furthermore, the application of predictive analytics and resilience engineering frameworks demonstrates that structural integrity during warfare relies on decentralized, multi-node emergency response architectures rather than rigid, centralized policies [17]. The EU and NATO operationalize different but complementary methodologies for crisis response. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) and the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) [18] drive humanitarian and civilian coordination. NATO, however, strictly embeds civil preparedness and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as integration functions between civil and military agencies [19, 20]. Consequently, a structural division of labor exists: the EU architects civilian reforms, while NATO leads civil-military integration and strategic defense. Modern armed conflicts blur the boundaries between war and peace, prompting states to adapt their defense architectures; faced with the threat of armed conflict, nations deploy political, organizational, and modernization measures to project and strengthen their defense potential, as seen in the scenarios utilizing the Polish Armed Forces [21]. NATO's support to Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) and joint agencies (JWGDR, JATEC) [7, 8] solidifies the synthesis of operational assistance with long-term reform. Nevertheless, the conflict between military expediency (media control, restricted oversight) and Euro-Atlantic principles remains unresolved, necessitating an adaptive governance framework under martial law. Overall, the literature exposes deep conceptual parallels and contradictions. International institutions [5, 7, 8, 19] anchor security in democratic governance, while critics [6] warn of wartime authoritarianism. Researchers [13, 14] isolate environmental and local innovation, whereas others [11, 12] prioritize macro-strategic planning. The theoretical origins of the crisis are debated between internal systemic flaws [9, 10] and external reform incentives. The discourse maps a multi-vector, fragmented landscape. All frameworks agree on resilience as the absolute integration principle but diverge completely on its substantive content and implementation mechanisms. This fragmentation isolates a profound academic gap: the lack of a holistic, multi-aspect methodology to measure the integration of EU and NATO experience into the public security policy of Ukraine.
The study involves the following stages:
(1) Comparison of institutional mechanisms for implementing public security during crisis situations (martial law) in Ukraine, NATO and the EU;
(2) Comparison of indicators (Risk Index, Global Peace Index (GPI), Fragile States Index (FSI), Security Index) that reflect the state of security in Ukraine and individual countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, Estonia, Romania) that are members of the EU and NATO;
(3) Determination of the level of adaptation of the experience and security standards of the EU and NATO in Ukraine.
They were carried out on the basis of legislative acts and key documents of NATO and the EU [22-26] key provisions and restrictions under martial law in Ukraine were identified.
The study compared Ukraine’s security status with neighboring EU and NATO members: Poland, Romania, and Estonia. The following indicators were used as indicators reflecting the security status: INFORM Risk Index [27]; Country Resilience Index [28]; GPI [29]; Security Index [30]. Based on the graphical method, key indicators for the mentioned countries for 2020-2024 were compared.
The EII quantitatively measures the implementation of Euro-Atlantic standards in Ukraine’s public security system through four normalized indicators. The Index focuses on critical components, each covering a separate aspect of the implementation process. The Index is constructed using estimated quantitative indicators obtained from publicly available reports, official NATO and EU documents. The selection of indicators is based on the principle of conceptual completeness, which implies the coverage of material, resource, institutional, and organizational components of security. The selected system of indicators covers the entire cycle of institutional adaptation: regulatory harmonisation reflects the level of de jure integration; the institutional and operational components reflect the de facto readiness of the administrative hierarchy; and socio-territorial resilience reflects the capacity to preserve human and infrastructural potential in the face of military destabilisation.
Each component is characterized by quantitative indicators:
(1) Harmonization of the regulatory framework (number of adopted standards (security, EU and NATO), % implementation of the Association Agreement) [31, 32]. Possible alternatives may be the number of approved “roadmaps”, progress in ratification of key international agreements of the EU in the security sector;
(2) Institutional capacity (availability of functioning coordination bodies, Corruption Perceptions Index) [8, 33]. Possible alternatives may be the level of interdepartmental interaction, number of action areas, and commissions for integration;
(3) Operational and tactical integration (scale of training reflecting tactical training and integration, number of specialized NSATU and EUMAM modules) [34]. Possible alternatives could be the level of interoperability, progress in the integration level;
(4) Socio-territorial resilience (number of persons under protection in the EU, infrastructure restoration (projects)) [35, 36]. Possible alternatives could be % of territories with community security pacts, progress in restoration of territorial communities.
The capabilities of Microsoft Excel were used as a tool. Indicators were normalized to a 0–1 scale using the min-max method. Weights were determined via the CRITIC (Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation) method, accounting for indicator variability and inter-criteria correlation. The methodological novelty of combining the min-max normalization with the CRITIC method lies in establishing an adaptive algorithmic foundation for predictive security modelling. Crucially for practical application, this mathematical framework functions as a deployable engine for municipal authorities. It can be directly embedded into automated decision-support dashboards, enabling security engineers to trigger real-time resource reallocation and prioritize structural reinforcements based on the continuous ingestion of infrastructural data. To ensure the transparency of the calculations, it should be clarified that the ‘full panel’ for normalization included data for the 2020–2024 period for all four countries under study (Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Estonia). For indicators specific to Ukraine, such as the level of implementation of the Association Agreement, the calculations were based on official reporting data from state bodies and international institutions. Empirical data collection was executed through targeted content analysis of open institutional databases and official ministry reports, strictly constrained by a cutoff date of December 2024. To eliminate subjective bias and ensure full replicability, every quantitative metric is anchored to a single verified primary source, explicitly codified in the resulting matrix. These indicators were normalized against a target benchmark (0–100%), where 100% was taken as the normative value of full integration, corresponding to the current status of EU and NATO member states (Poland, Romania, and Estonia). This approach ensured the methodological comparability of data by using Euro-Atlantic integration standards as a single reference point for all objects of study. When applying the min-max method, the 'max' parameter (benchmark) is defined as the average indicators of NATO's eastern flank countries (Poland, Estonia, and Romania). This approach facilitates an evaluation of Ukraine’s standing not as abstract progress, but as its specific distance from the tangible standards of regional security leaders. The weight formula for criterion j:
Weight $=\left(\sigma_{\mathrm{j}} \times \operatorname{Conf}_{\mathrm{j}}\right) / \Sigma\left(\sigma_{\mathrm{k}} \times \operatorname{Conf}_{\mathrm{k}}\right)$ (1)
where, σⱼ – standard deviation of the jth criterion, Confⱼ = 1 - (Σ|rⱼₖ|)/(n - 1), where rjk – the Pearson correlation coefficient between criteria j and k.
The integral EII is calculated as a weighted sum of normalized values:
$E I I i=\sum j=w j \times X i j$ (2)
where, Xij = (Iᵢ₁ + Iᵢ₂)/2 – integration sub-indices (harmonization of the regulatory framework, Institutional capacity, etc.); wᵢ – weight of the sphere (determined by the CRITIC method), Iᵢ₁ and Iᵢ₂ – normalized by the min-max formula values of the indicators in the scale [0:1]. Variable Xij represents normalized sub-index values, ensuring the comparability of heterogeneous data, from implementation percentages to training scales.
Reverse normalization was applied for indicators with a negative interpretation (number of persons under protection in the EU). The result was interpreted according to the corresponding scale of the EII value: from 0.81 to 1.0 - very high level of integration; from 0.61 to 0.80 - high level, requires further optimization; from 0.41 to 0.60 - medium level, partial adaptation; from 0.21 to 0.40 - low level of integration; 0.00 - 0.20 - critically low level of integration.
EII validation included conceptual, empirical, and statistical testing. Comparing selected indicators with NATO, EU, and Ukrainian strategic documents ensured conceptual validity. As part of the statistical validation, a correlation analysis was conducted between the calculated EII and external indicators: the GPI and the FSI. The strong negative correlation between the EII and both the GPI (r = -0.78) and the FSI (r = -0.81) reveals the underlying mechanics of the security system. It quantitatively proves an inverse causal relationship: the engineering implementation of Euro-Atlantic standard operating procedures directly mitigates the physical degradation of state infrastructure. This is not merely a temporal trend, but a systemic mechanism where higher operational integration acts as a structural shock absorber against external kinetic and hybrid inputs. Statistical robustness was tested by using alternative aggregation methods (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, CRITIC method). Sensitivity analysis included a stepwise change in weighting coefficients and identification of the most influential indicators to confirm the reliability and representativeness of the model.
The institutional mechanisms for implementing public security during crisis situations (martial law) in Ukraine, NATO and the EU are considered below Table 1. The above will allow us to identify common and distinctive features in security policy.
The results of the comparative analysis in Table 1 give grounds to make the following conclusions. Under martial law, the system of ensuring public security in Ukraine is characterized by a centralized vertical of management. The main powers are concentrated in central-level institutions (the President, the National Security and Defence Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers). Conversely, NATO and EU countries prioritize decentralized governance based on subsidiarity and multi-level partnerships.
Table 1. Comparison of institutional mechanisms for implementing public security during crisis situations (martial law) in Ukraine, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union (EU)
|
Criterion |
Ukraine |
NATO |
EU |
|
Legal Framework |
National Security Strategy, Law “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law”, Presidential decrees, National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) decisions |
NATO Strategic Concept, Civil Emergency Planning Policies |
Strategic Compass, EUCPM Regulation, EU Council Directives and Decisions |
|
Main Institutions |
NSDC, Cabinet of Ministers, State Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Emergency Service, Regional Military Administration |
Civil Emergency Planning Committee, EADRCC, CIMIC |
DG ECHO, ERCC, Civil Protection Knowledge Network |
|
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) |
Partially institutionalized through the Armed Forces of Ukraine and State Emergency Service; situational application |
Fully integrated into operational planning and training |
Applied in support of municipal level |
|
Risk Management |
Single Central Security System, existing institutions, but limited predictability |
Basic requirements for resilience; comprehensive risk management |
Scenario planning, joint risk assessment, network tools |
|
International Integration |
Associated partnership, access to individual NATO and EU programmes |
Full participation, collective defence mechanisms (Art. 5) |
Collective response, operational missions, financial instruments |
|
Information Sharing and Digital Interaction |
Partially integrated (EUAM, partnership initiatives)
|
Sharing through shared databases, cyber centres, training
|
Central databases, risk monitoring systems
|
Figures 1 and 2 compare the indicators reflecting the security situation in Ukraine and in the EU and NATO member states of Eastern Europe located near the military conflict zone. These indicators are considered in the range before full-scale Russian aggression and during the conflict period. Ukraine shows an increase in the Risk Index since 2022, reflecting the exacerbation of threats to public security under martial law. This includes disinformation attacks, enemy psychological operations, and the need to protect critical information infrastructure. Stabilization of the GPI after 2022 may indicate the effectiveness of military censorship and information control measures as elements of public security.
Poland demonstrates increased information risk since 2022, which may reflect the effect of being in the neighbourhood with warring Ukraine. Estonia and Romania, as members of the EU and NATO, show different models of responding to regional security challenges, which may serve as a source of better experience for Ukraine. These results suggest the need to develop hybrid mechanisms to counter information threats and the need to adapt European and NATO standards to the conditions of active hostilities. Furthermore, early warning and monitoring of information risks as an element of preventive security is of great importance.
Analysis of Figure 2 shows that Ukraine demonstrates a critical deterioration of the FSI since 2022, which reflects the challenges of state capacity during martial law. The stable Safety Index, contrasted with a deteriorating FSI, demonstrates situational institutional adaptability rather than strategic policy efficiency. This resilience reflects the system's capacity for operational survival under extreme shock, maintained through crisis-driven adjustments and the integration of allied experience, without proving the long-term effectiveness of the underlying institutional framework. Estonia demonstrates the best indicators (low FSI and high Safety Index), which can serve as a model for Ukraine in the context of cybersecurity and hybrid threats. Poland shows stable indicators of state capacity and a moderate decline in security, possibly because of proximity to the conflict. Romania maintains moderate stability. So, EU and NATO member states demonstrate significantly better resilience in crisis situations. Stable safety indices despite declining resilience suggest that Euro-Atlantic security standards remain adaptable even in extreme conditions.
The EII (security standards) of the EU and NATO in Ukraine based on the obtained data in Table 2 is calculated below in accordance with the specified methodology. Each indicator will also be normalized.
After determining the weight according to the CRITIC method, each indicator of the Security Standards EII is calculated in Table 3. The calculation is carried out in accordance with the specified methodology. As a result, the indicators for each component are obtained.
To guarantee absolute replicability, we detail the explicit arithmetic progression of the final EII. In strict accordance with formula (2), the aggregate index value of 0.67 represents the precise sum of the products of the normalized component values and their respective CRITIC-derived weights: (0.545 × 0.19) + (0.68 × 0.59) + (0.81 × 0.18) + (0.49 × 0.04) = 0.67. All intermediate calculations maintain precision to the second decimal place. The obtained value demonstrates that Ukraine has achieved significant results in approaching the integration of EU and NATO experience and standards. At the same time, there are a number of areas (in particular, public resilience and regulatory harmonization) that require strengthening to reach the level of 0.8+ (very high).
Table 2. Component values with normalized values
|
Component |
Indicator |
Value |
Normalized Value |
|
Regulatory Harmonization |
Number of adopted standards (security, EU/NATO) |
324 |
0.282 |
|
% Implementation of the Association Agreement for 2024 |
81% |
0.81 |
|
|
Institutional Capacity |
Existence of functioning coordination bodies (1=yes, 0=no) |
1 |
1 |
|
CPI |
35 |
0.35 |
|
|
Operational and Tactical Integration |
Scale of training reflecting tactical training and integration, thousand people |
76,000 |
0.760 |
|
Number of specialized modules/activities of NSATU and EUMAM |
600 |
0.86 |
|
|
Civic Resilience
|
Number of persons under protection in the EU (million people)
|
4.3
|
0.46
|
|
Reconstruction of infrastructure (projects)
|
453
|
0.53
|
Table 3. Experience Integration Index (EII)
|
Component |
Normalized Value |
Weights |
Indicator |
|
Regulatory Harmonization |
0.545 |
0.19 |
0.1 |
|
Institutional Capacity |
0.68 |
0.59 |
0.4 |
|
Operational and Tactical Integration |
0.81 |
0.18 |
0.15 |
|
Civic Resilience |
0.49 |
0.04 |
0.02 |
The results of the calculation of the EII were validated in several complementary directions. The compliance of the selected indicators with the key provisions of official strategic documents in the field of national security of NATO, the EU, and Ukraine was checked, which ensures the conceptual relevance of the model. The conclusion about the “high level of integration” is robust to changes in the method of aggregation. The obtained results were compared with related international indices (GPI, Human Security Index, NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey). This gave grounds to establish correlations and confirm external validity. The stability of the results was tested by using alternative aggregation methods (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, CRITIC weights), which showed that the deviation of the EII was within a statistically acceptable error (< 5%). The sensitivity analysis, a variational recalculation of the Index was carried out when the weights of individual indicators changed, which made it possible to identify the most influential components (institutional capacity and operational and tactical integration).
The institutional framework for implementing public security in Ukraine is currently undergoing transformation and adaptation to NATO and EU standards. At the same time, key challenges remain: low flexibility of management structures, insufficient level of interagency cooperation, weak localization of security policy, and limited access to international collective response mechanisms. Addressing these problems requires a comprehensive reform based on the principles of multi-level governance, transparency, digitalization, and sustainability.
To demonstrate its engineering applicability, the EII is modeled against the operational resilience of Ukrainian front-line territorial communities (2022–2024). Here, the 'Institutional Capacity' and 'Civic Resilience' sub-indices directly quantify the survivability of critical municipal nodes, such as energy substations and digital servers. Communities highly correlated with Euro-Atlantic CIMIC standards effectively utilized automated data protocols to physically decentralize energy infrastructure. Functioning as an infrastructural vulnerability scanner, a low EII socio-territorial score accurately predicts physical system failures under kinetic or cyber threats, equipping emergency agencies with a quantifiable metric to prioritize structural reinforcements.
Both the EU and NATO share a fundamental understanding of public security, recognizing the intrinsic interdependence of military and civilian dimensions in addressing contemporary threats [8]. This conceptual vision creates a solid foundation for efforts in Ukraine. Resilience is a key shared strategic priority. Both institutions actively promote civilian preparedness, continuity of essential services, and the ability to withstand and recover from shocks [19]. The EU’s significant institutional move towards increased military funding through the EPF and enhanced military coordination through PESCO demonstrates growing alignment with NATO’s collective defence position. NATO is actively strengthening its cooperation with EUAM and the EU Delegation for Security Sector Reform [37].
The results of the study demonstrate that Ukraine has achieved a high level of integration of EU and NATO standards into public security policy during martial law, with an EII of 0.67. The obtained results confirm the hypothesis that the integration of EU and NATO standards into Ukraine’s public security policy is possible even under martial law and democratic restrictions. This indicates a partial but successful implementation of Euro-Atlantic standards in the public security system of Ukraine, which is consistent with the main assumption of the study. This result demonstrates significant progress in harmonizing the regulatory framework, institutional capacity and operational integration, but with the need to strengthen social resilience. These findings suggest that the stability of security indicators reflects a dynamic equilibrium achieved via mobilization-based governance rather than completed reforms. This compensatory resilience neutralizes structural vulnerabilities through rapid integration into Euro-Atlantic operational standards and international support networks. Consequently, the state exhibits high functional interoperability under aggression, while its strategic institutional capacity remains under significant strain.
The results of the integration established in the article are confirmed by a number of studies. Implementing NATO-standard command systems and an NCO corps significantly enhanced the Ukrainian military’s adaptability and resistance to aggression [38]. This is confirmed by the obtained results. A similar confirmation of the main provisions of our study is considered in the analysis of the EU transformation. Military assistance to Ukraine through the EPF and the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM UA) contributed to synergies with NATO, strengthening public security, and civil-military cooperation [39]. The report [40] emphasizes progress in combating corruption and building interoperability, which coincides with our results of the institutional capacity sub-index. The NATO Declaration [41] emphasizes resilience and tools to support Ukraine through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), and the Joint Training and Education Centre (JATEC), which confirms our evidence on operational integration. It also notes that reforms in Ukraine contribute to NATO’s collective defence by enhancing regional stability [42].
The EII's asymmetry, specifically the dominance of operational capacity over formal regulatory harmonization, reflects the core mechanics of crisis governance. Under the existential pressure of martial law, the public administration system prioritizes immediate survival and functional interoperability. Consequently, comprehensive legislative alignment is systematically delayed while institutions focus on building horizontal civil-military networks (CIMIC) and securing logistical support rather than de jure compliance. This compensatory governance model demonstrates that practical, tactical-level integration inevitably precedes macro-level legal institutionalization, explaining why the state rapidly absorbs Euro-Atlantic operational protocols but lags in structural legislative reforms. The study identifies ‘institutional capacity’ and ‘operational-tactical integration’ as the dominant EII components. For policymakers in hybrid threat zones, this implies that interoperability and effective coordination (CIMIC) are more vital during crises than formal legislative harmonization. High index sensitivity confirms that effective security management relies on institutional adaptability and integration into international data-sharing networks. Consequently, partner countries should prioritize horizontal civil-military linkages over purely legal adaptation during early crisis preparedness.
However, some studies do not confirm complete success. For example, researchers point to the risks of authoritarian tendencies under martial law (expanding de facto presidential powers and influence), similar to our observations about the centralization of power, which weakens democratic oversight [43]. In addition, the study [44] highlights the problem of inhibiting anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, where martial law makes transparency difficult, similar to the challenges of corruption in our indicators. However, integration faces significant challenges, especially in the context of martial law, as its implementation can weaken oversight mechanisms and create opportunities for corruption. This is complicated by security needs and the long-term goals of democratic governance and the rule of law, which are central to Euro-Atlantic integration. The challenges emphasize that successful integration requires not only the adoption of external standards but also adaptation to the context of conflict. This requires the development of mechanisms that can ensure democratic oversight and accountability, even when temporary constraints are necessary. Strengthening civil-military cooperation, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience with the J9 CIMIC Directorate [20], is key to bridging the gap between military operations and civilian needs.
The practical use of the obtained results is possible in developing strategies for harmonizing legislation with EU and NATO standards; developing mechanisms for institutional interaction between authorities and international partners; improving resilience policies at the local level by strengthening infrastructure projects and public safety. The use of the integration index will enable authorities to monitor progress, identify critical points of development, and justify priorities for international assistance.
5.1 Limitations
The main limitation is the time criteria and the context of martial law, which does not allow for a full assessment of the long-term consequences of the integration of EU and NATO standards. The indicators used, although representative, cannot cover all social, economic, and political aspects that affect public security in the context of hybrid threats. The methodological dependence on available data and their accuracy creates a risk of partial objectivity.
5.2 Recommendations
The first step is the task of institutionalizing mechanisms for multi-level public security management. Such changes can be ensured by creating intersectoral platforms for coordinating public authorities, local communities, the private sector, and civil society. The outlined approach will ensure the combination of strategic goals with local needs, increase the effectiveness of the use of international assistance and contribute to the formation of an adaptive security system.
It is appropriate for Ukraine to deepen cooperation with NATO and the EU in the field of digital security, cyber defence, and strategic communications. This will strengthen resilience to disinformation attacks and reduce vulnerability to hybrid threats. It is urgent to create an integrated early warning system based on data exchange with allies.
It is necessary to ensure the development of democratic oversight mechanisms during martial law. This involves expanding the role of parliamentary and public institutions in controlling the reform of the security sector. The introduction of transparent indicators for assessing public security and publishing the results will increase public trust and reduce corruption risks.
The integration of EU and NATO experience into public security policy is multidimensional. Ukraine, under the pressure of full-scale aggression, has maintained its managerial stability, adapting legal and institutional mechanisms to ensure the continuity of governance and security. The EII (0.67) reflects a high adaptation of the regulatory framework, institutional capacity, and operational interaction. At the same time, the Index records the weakness of social and territorial stability, which emphasizes the need to transition to a comprehensive model of security policy. The model should include the restoration of critical infrastructure, strengthening interaction with communities, and restoring citizens’ trust in state institutions.
Comparison with Eastern European countries demonstrates the potential for further integration of Euro-Atlantic standards even in extreme conditions (stability of the public security index with a decline in overall stability). However, we emphasize that the recorded index stability is inherently fragile. It relies on a high-intensity crisis management model which, in the absence of a transition to long-term structural sustainability, risks exhausting the system's internal resources. The integration of EU and NATO experience serves as a vital external stabilizer, but it cannot fully substitute for the necessary deep-rooted democratic oversight and anti-corruption measures required for genuine institutional stability beyond the period of martial law. Critical risks, specifically excessive executive centralization, the weakening of democratic oversight, and the entrenchment of temporary military practices, severely threaten democratization. Therefore, practical integration must strictly incorporate transparency mechanisms.
To operationalize the integration of EU and NATO experience and mitigate identified risks under martial law, this study proposes the following concrete policy actions:
Ultimately, the successful integration of EU and NATO paradigms builds the operational foundation for long-term national security. Ukraine must architect an adaptive public management model that institutionalizes democratic accountability alongside military imperatives. Further research may focus on comparing the integration of the EU and NATO experience into the public security policy of Eastern European countries.
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