A C4ISR-Integrated Framework for Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment in Nusantara Capital City

3.1 Research design

This study is grounded in a qualitative approach that combines a structured literature review, policy document analysis, and conceptual mapping informed by practitioner-level insights derived from national security forums. Rather than relying on an unsystematic reading of available sources, the literature review was designed around a clear and transparent search and selection procedure, drawing on PRISMA-style reporting principles, so that the evidence base underpinning the study can be traced and defended.

The search covered three main source repositories. Scopus was used to access indexed international peer-reviewed work; Google Scholar was used to broaden coverage to include grey literature and institutional reports; and SINTA/Garuda was used to capture Indonesian-language contributions that may not appear in international databases. Across these platforms, search strings were built around five thematic anchors: C4ISR, smart city security, critical infrastructure protection, CARVER+Shock, and IKN. These terms were combined with Boolean operators, and the search was limited to publications between 2000 and 2025 in either English or Indonesian. This initial search identified approximately 180 records.

The document set was then narrowed in several stages. First, titles and abstracts were screened to remove duplicates, sources without credible peer review or institutional backing, and pre-2000 works that could not reasonably be treated as foundational to current debates.

This step excluded 112 records and left 68 for closer examination. The remaining documents were read in full and assessed against the study’s thematic focus. A further 27 records were excluded because they were only tangentially related to the research questions or did not provide sufficient methodological detail for synthesis. The 41 studies that passed all stages of assessment form the empirical and theoretical backbone of the analysis in this study. The overall selection process is summarized in a PRISMA-like flow diagram (see Figure 1), which traces the reduction from approximately 180 initial records to 41 studies included in the qualitative synthesis. The relationship between this literature base and the parameter scoring reported in Section 6 is made explicit in Section 3.3, where the scoring rationale for each CARVER+Shock dimension is traced to specific clusters of the reviewed literature.

Figure 1. Structured literature review flow

3.2 Data sources

Data were drawn from several complementary sources. The first source consists of peer-reviewed academic literature from indexed international and national journals, with particular focus on C4ISR, smart city security, critical infrastructure protection, and the CARVER+Shock methodology. A second source consists of official policy documents, including IKN’s Smart City Blueprint published by the Nusantara Capital City Authority (OIKN) and relevant national cybersecurity and defense regulations. The third source consists of international institutional references from NATO CCDCOE and the MITRE Corporation, along with documented experiences from Tel Aviv and Singapore. Finally, the analysis draws on practitioner insights gained through the author’s participation in national strategic forums, including a formal presentation at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs and technical discussions with the Research and Development Division of BIN [27].

This study also incorporates selected institutional and policy documents to capture real-time developments and regulatory contexts that are not yet fully reflected in the academic literature. Such sources are used selectively and primarily to complement, rather than replace, peer-reviewed evidence, particularly in areas where rapidly evolving policy environments, such as IKN development, limit the availability of indexed scholarly publications.

3.3 Analytical procedure

The analysis unfolded in three stages. It began by mapping the relevant literature on C4ISR and CARVER+Shock and identifying the issues that global debates have not yet addressed in relation to smart cities in developing countries. Building on this mapping, the study then translated the identified gap into a conceptual smart defense framework for IKN that links military, civilian, and digital domains and is deliberately designed to take advantage of IKN’s greenfield status. Finally, the CARVER+Shock parameters were applied to IKN’s main categories of critical assets, generating illustrative vulnerability scores that translate the framework into concrete prioritization guidance for security planners [28]. In this final stage, each CARVER+Shock parameter score was informed by a specific cluster of the reviewed literature. The Criticality and Effect scores drew primarily on studies of cascading infrastructure failure; the Accessibility and Vulnerability scores drew on smart city and physical security literature; and the Recognizability and Shock scores drew on social resilience and critical infrastructure studies. This mapping connects the qualitative synthesis of 41 studies to the scores reported in Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 2. CARVER+Shock assessment of IKN critical assets

Table 3. CARVER+Shock assessment of the power grid, fuel distribution system, and communications subsector

3.4 Validity and limitations

Analytical validity was strengthened through source triangulation, combining academic literature, government documents, and practitioner-derived insights. Given the cross-disciplinary nature of the subject, which spans technical, policy, and operational dimensions, no single source type provides a complete picture.

The principal limitation of the study lies in the illustrative character of the CARVER+Shock scores presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Because IKN’s operational asset data are not yet publicly accessible for academic purposes, the scores reflect conceptual estimation. However, they are not arbitrary. The scores were derived through a single-analyst, literature-triangulated process: parameter calibration was benchmarked against established CARVER+Shock applications in critical infrastructure and food-sector risk assessment literature, and cross-checked against practitioner input obtained through engagement in national-level security discussions, including presentations to the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs and exchanges with the Research and Development Division of BIN [27]. This is explicitly not a formal multi-expert elicitation procedure, such as a Delphi panel. It is a single-analyst judgment, cross-checked against the literature and practitioner discussion but not independently verified by a separate panel of raters. This is acknowledged here as a methodological limitation of the present study.

To enhance analytical consistency, cross-parameter validation was applied by comparing scoring patterns across asset categories, ensuring that assets with higher systemic interdependency consistently yielded higher Effect and Shock values. An informal robustness reflection was also conducted by re-examining whether the ranking of top-priority assets would change under moderate variation in individual parameter values. The ranking of the highest-priority assets did not change under this reflection, which provides a preliminary indication, not a statistical guarantee, that the prioritization order is not an artifact of any single parameter judgment.

7.1 The strategic value of greenfield integration

The findings of this study point to one particularly significant implication: the optimal moment to build security into a city is before the city fully exists. IKN’s greenfield character is not merely a logistical convenience; it is a strategic asset that existing smart city frameworks have largely overlooked. Tel Aviv and Singapore both achieved high levels of smart defense integration, but they did so through the incremental retrofitting of security systems onto pre-existing urban fabrics [22, 24]. IKN can, in principle, achieve a higher degree of architectural coherence by designing C4ISR connectivity, sensor infrastructure, and redundancy mechanisms into its physical and digital layout from the outset. The integrated framework proposed here is structured to realize this advantage.

7.2 Limitations and conditions for full implementation

Implementing this framework at full operational fidelity depends on resolving gaps that currently exist outside the academic domain. The most pressing is data access: the CARVER+Shock scores in Table 2 and Table 3 are calibrated estimates, not field measurements, and they will need to be replaced with classified asset assessments once IKN reaches operational status. This limitation is not a flaw in the framework; rather, it is a consequence of the greenfield condition. A more structurally difficult issue is the regulatory gap. Indonesia’s existing defense and security legislation does not yet define clear command authority among TNI, POLRI, BIN, and OIKN in a joint smart defense context. Without a legal foundation, the inter-agency coordination described in Section 5.2 remains aspirational. The final constraint is institutional: operating C4ISR systems and conducting CARVER+Shock assessments require a specialist workforce that does not yet exist at scale in Indonesia’s defense sector. A technically sound framework operated by an underprepared workforce will not deliver its full potential.

7.3 Theoretical contribution

The theoretical significance of this study lies not in demonstrating that CARVER+Shock can be transplanted to a new domain, but in identifying a specific modification that the methodology requires when applied to a cyber-physical urban context. This study proposes disaggregating the Accessibility parameter for cyber-physical urban infrastructure into three vector-specific components: physical accessibility, cyber accessibility, and supply-chain accessibility. These components can be aggregated into a weighted composite score rather than reported as a single undifferentiated value, as discussed in Section 3.4 and Section 6.2 and illustrated in Table 4. This modification directly addresses a structural limitation of the original CARVER+Shock methodology when applied beyond single-vector physical targets. It therefore constitutes the study’s principal theoretical contribution, rather than merely confirming that the tool’s underlying logic holds in a new setting. The proposed integration model, which pairs C4ISR architecture with CARVER+Shock in a greenfield planning context, is not IKN-specific. Countries building new administrative centers or expanding capital functions into underdeveloped regions face structurally similar problems. The broader implication for defense planning scholarship is that frameworks developed for NATO conditions or high-income East Asian contexts may require substantial recalibration before they can be applied to countries where regulatory infrastructure, institutional capacity, and technology access differ significantly.

Table 4. Illustrative disaggregation of the accessibility parameter for the three highest-ranked assets

To make this disaggregation concrete rather than purely conceptual, Table 4 applies it to the three highest-ranked assets identified in Table 3 and Section 6.3. The physical, cyber, and supply-chain component scores are illustrative expert judgments consistent with the single-analyst procedure described in Section 3.4. The weights reflect the relative dominance of each access vector for each asset type. For example, transmission towers are physically exposed in open terrain and are therefore weighted more heavily on the physical vector, whereas Control Systems are reached predominantly through network access and are therefore weighted more heavily on the cyber vector. The weighted composite reproduces, within rounding, the single Accessibility value already reported in Table 3, confirming that the disaggregation refines the existing score rather than requiring a wholesale re-derivation of the table.

This worked example is limited to three assets. Extending it to the remaining categories in Table 2 and Table 3 is left for future research once operational access data become available, consistent with the limitation acknowledged in Section 3.4.

7.4 Policy recommendations

In alignment with IKN’s formal designation as a strategic national area, several measures require immediate attention. Because Control Systems within the Control Center received the highest composite risk score in this study’s assessment, namely 51/70 in Table 3, the highest-priority element of the proposed security standard should be a mandatory redundant command pathway and a segmented or logically isolated network architecture for this specific asset, rather than a uniform standard applied equally across all asset classes. IKN requires a comprehensive special security standard that covers physical, cyber, and hybrid threats, accompanied by a National Mitigation and Contingency Plan that sets out threat-anticipation procedures, unified emergency response chains, clear command lines, and escalation mechanisms for incidents that endanger the continuity of government. These instruments should be grounded in a cross-agency audit of IKN’s critical asset inventory, providing the empirical basis for a formal CARVER+Shock assessment [27, 38].

Once core infrastructure becomes operational, the main task shifts from basic preparedness to system-level integration. This includes developing an IC3 based on C4ISR principles and linking it to all critical infrastructure and public service systems, while simultaneously tightening the cybersecurity and data-protection regime that regulates information flows among military, civilian, and commercial actors in IKN. Because the Transmission Subsystem, specifically Towers and Cable Networks, ranked second in this study’s risk assessment at 50.5/70 in Table 3, the IC3 rollout during this period should prioritize the integration of transmission-network monitoring sensors before extending coverage to lower-ranked asset categories. Regular joint training and simulation exercises involving TNI, POLRI, BIN, OIKN, and digital infrastructure operators are needed to ensure that these institutional arrangements function as intended [39, 40].

Over the longer term, the aim should be to build a self-sustaining smart defense ecosystem rather than a set of ad hoc projects. Because the CARVER+Shock assessment in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 consistently ranks Control Systems, the IKN Data Center, and transmission infrastructure as the highest-risk asset categories, long-term investment should prioritize sovereign engineering capacity for control-system and data-center hardware and software before extending the same domestic-development goal to lower-ranked asset categories. This objective requires sustained investment in domestically developed defense technologies to reduce strategic dependence on foreign systems, together with predictable human-resource pipelines connecting defense universities, technical institutes, and national defense agencies. Priority should be given to training specialists in the control-system and data-center domains identified above. In parallel, collaborative research with universities should be used to advance next-generation smart defense methodologies, while international cooperation frameworks should provide channels for sharing good practice, interoperability standards, and smart city security benchmarks with other large urban development programs around the world [26, 38].