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Manufacturing companies aim for the optimization of their processes by means of Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), in order to keep-up with the competition and the evolution of clients’ needs. This transformation is based on connecting the shop floor systems to the high business layer ones. Based on the limitations of the existing architectures in the literature, we proposed the BLAEM architecture (Bi-Level Architecture for Efficient Manufacturing), an ISA95- based architecture that relies on six major aspects, among which we can cite Cybersecurity. In this paper, we focus on this specific aspect, and we try to elaborate a security index to evaluate the implementation of our architecture.
manufacturing systems, cybersecurity, industrial security, computer integrated manufacturing, systems architecture
Industrial companies have had to adapt to changing situations due to fierce competition driven by increasing customer demands. To efficiently control the development of products, processes, and production systems, companies have had to integrate technologies and data from other areas with the process of manufacturing [1]. This change is known by various names, including Smart Manufacturing [2] and Computer-Integrated Manufacturing [3, 4].
The key drivers of this trend are the automation of industrial processes and the facilitation of data exchange, which can be achieved by integrating every system within the manufacturing process into the same architecture. The aim is to create a fully connected plant where all the retrieved information is reusable to optimize the various business processes and thereby create a smart factory.
To attain this, the connection between different levels of the factory must be ensured, ranging from the shop floor where production machines are located to the most advanced level of the plant where the company's strategies are defined. However, the aggregation and contextualization of data from heterogeneous systems throughout the production life cycle pose a significant challenge. This affiliation is challenged by the normal trouble of agglomerating and contextualizing data from heterogeneous frameworks over the generation life cycle [5].
In this way, we came up with a reference design competent of interfacing the generation and data frameworks of the company. This architecture is based on six major aspects: Data integration, Systems integration, Security, Monitoring & Data analysis, Mobility and finally Cloud computing.
In this paper, we will handle the security aspect for its major role of ensuring a stable and successful implementation of BLAEM. To help companies evaluate their implementation using quantitative indicator, we will elaborate a security index based on cybersecurity directives collected from some of the relevant standards.
This digitization of processes for the industrial companied is fulfilled through interfacing the genuine world to the virtual one, utilizing cyber physical frameworks, sensors and IT Frameworks. Be that because it may, the utilization of a few frameworks and advances inside the same environment is especially challenging, ordinarily due to the dissimilarities between them and particularities of each one of them. Consequently, analysts have been able to propose structures able of enveloping each framework within the CIM setting.
2.1 CIM architectures
A systematic literature review (SLR) has been conducted on this subject. Its fundamental destinations were to examine the diverse approaches proposed to handle computer integrated manufacturing architectures, in order to identify the nature of contributions in this area and to determine the diverse aspects addressed by them [6].
Twelve papers examined as part of our research have put forth various architectures. One such example is the architecture proposed by Sprock and McGinnis [7], aimed at bridging the gap between system data and analysis models for smart manufacturing. Similarly, Tang et al. [8] proposed the Cloud-Assisted Self-Organized Architecture (CASOA), which creates a vertically enabled system for data consolidation, another architecture, the Cloud Based Framework developed by Caggiano et al. [9], offers real-time diagnosis for smart monitoring of machining. Tao et al. [10] also presented their Data-Driven Smart manufacturing Framework, which utilizes data collected during the manufacturing process to enhance its efficiency.
2.2 CIM-related aspects
After the analysis of the chosen papers, we identified six aspects that we considered basic to handle in a contribution:
• Systems Integration: The ability of a solution to facilitate the integration and cooperation between multiple IT systems within a single architecture [10].
• Data Integration: It consists of contextualizing data from diverse systems throughout the production life cycle [11].
• Security: The solution's capacity to establish secure connections for system integration and safeguard the access to production data from external sources [12].
• Monitoring & Data Analysis: This aspect involves leveraging gathered manufacturing data to enhance productivity, which can be categorized into two types of data. The first type is Real-time Data that is typically utilized for monitoring, while the second type is Historic Data employed for data analysis [13].
• Mobility: Consists of using mobile oriented applications and terminals for data monitoring [14].
• Cloud Computing: This aspect pertains to the solution's ability to utilize cloud computing for some or all of its functionalities [15].
2.3 Bi-level architecture for efficient manufacturing (BLAEM)
To address the shortcomings of the approaches analyzed in the SLR, we suggest implementing the Bi-Level Architecture for efficient Manufacturing (BLEAM), which is based on the hierarchical structure of the ANSI/ISA-95 standard. The proposed system prioritizes the arrangement of systems, with the ERP positioned at the top of the pyramid and the machines situated at the bottom. Additionally, the architecture is designed based on the concept that the Manufacturing Execution System (MES) is the central component of the Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) and links the entire production system to enterprise resources [16].
Our proposal advocates for the division of the company's production system into two distinct levels. as appeared in Figure 1:
In order for us to establish evidence of the architecture’s consistency, we will be projecting it upon the six aspects we recovered from the literature.
2.3.1 Systems integration
BLAEM enables the company’s systems to communicate by means of common communication protocols:
• OPC Server / PLCs- Measuring Apparatuses: An OPC Server can communicate using various protocols, depending on the specific machine it is connected to. It can leverage the OPC UA protocol if the machine is already utilizing it, or alternatively, it can utilize the specific PLC Driver of the machine.
• MES / OPC Server: The MES system is treated as an OPC Client, and communication is established using the OPC UA protocol or, in some cases, HTTPS. To meet these requirements, software editors are integrating OPC-UA interpreters into their systems.
• Workstations / MES: The data generated by the MES can be approached using HTTP by means of workstations or any other sort of Graphical User Interface.
• Print Server / MES: The printing server and the MES are linked through the TCP/IP protocol, and with the Printers through The IPP protocol.
• ERP / MES: This connection is generally accomplished through HTTPS. However, for certain solutions, Request for Comments (RFC) protocol or even some niche canals of communication are mandatory.
Figure 1. BLAEM architecture
2.3.2 Data integration
This aspect can be reduced to 2 main points:
2.3.3 Monitoring & data analysis / mobility
The MES applications invest us the capacity to uncover generation information in arrange to expend it by Client- sort applications by implies of web-services and Web- attachments. Besides, modern MES Arrangements give modules of advancement which empowers the client to create cross-platform Web Applications. Not as they are these applications for Generation observing, they moreover play out in traceability and Dashboarding applications like ANDONS and Cockpits. These applications are able of devouring the distributed information. This permits for real-time palpability on the production’s life-cycle, gives decision-makers direction, and speaks to Mobile-Friendly applications for a straightforward get to data.
2.3.4 Cloud computing
As previously mentioned, BLAEM consists of two levels: the corporate level that encompasses the ERP shared among all the company's plants and deployed on a Cloud server, and the Plant level that includes the remaining systems, which are deployed on-premise.
The digital transformation has made a real impact on the industrial companies, by improving their efficiency by 15 to 20 percent [17], not to mention the benefits that result from analyzing all the collected data from the CIM context. This transformation can never be successful without relying on stable environments and secured systems, which makes the Security aspect one of the most relevant challenges to be dealt with.
The Cisco 2018 Annual Cybersecurity Reports [18] showed that 31% of organizations have experienced cyber-attacks on Operational Technology (OT). A survey conducted by the Small Business Administration (SBA) showed that 88% of small business owners felt their business was vulnerable to a cyber-attack. while 64% of leaders of organizations declared that cybersecurity and technology related risks are currently managed in an "inadequate" or "to be improved" way.
Despite these statistics, only 16% of organizations are ready to face cybersecurity challenges, as per other surveys. This is due to the lack of accurate reference standards and the lack of managerial and technical skills to understand and implement them [19].
In this section we demonstrate the importance of the Security aspect, and why it has to be taken seriously. For that, we will go over the most important vulnerabilities that can be related to our architecture assets, the common threats in the industrial domain, and the business impacts they can leave on the company. And to countermeasure that, we will present some security standards that can provide us with the best guidelines to be applied for maximum security.
3.1 Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are defined as weaknesses within the IT system that might be exploited by intruders to compromise the cyber-physical system [20]. In a more common point of view, NIST glossary of key information security terms [21] allude to vulnerability as weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited by a threat source. According to the Kaspersky report in 2015, the number of vulnerabilities rose from 2 to 189 between the years 1997 and 2015. [22] Based on 4 reports established by the Kaspersky Lab [23], the U.S Department of Homeland security [24], Norton LifeLock formerly known as Symantec [25, 26], and Positive technologies [27], we came up with a list of the most common vulnerabilities in the industrial environment:
company are configured inappropriately, by preserving default settings for example or not controlling what to be installed on the devices.
security or Software-Based assets such as Outdated or Unmanaged Software.
We will utilize the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as a standardized method to assess the severity of the vulnerabilities mentioned earlier. This system provides a quantitative indicator to allocate severity scores for cybersecurity threats, enabling users to prioritize responses and allocate resources accordingly. The latest version, CVSS v3.1, which was released in 2019 [28], will be used. The scoring is based on a formula that considers various metrics to estimate the ease and impact of an exploit. The scores range from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most severe. Those are the metrics that are used:
We applied the scoring system for the already listed vulnerabilities, and we recorded the results in Table 1.
3.2 Cyber-security threats
The NIST glossary characterizes threat as “any circumstance or occasion with the potential to antagonistically affect organizational operations (counting mission, capacities, picture, or notoriety), organizational resources, people, other organizations, or the Country through a data framework by means of unauthorized get to, annihilation, divulgence, adjustment of data, and/or dissent of service”.
A systematic literature review that has been conducted on this topic by Lezzi et al. [20]. This research analyzed 40 scientific papers in order to identify the major security threats that has been treated in the literature. The top 8 threats can be listed as follows:
Table 1. Vulnerabilities with their associated CVSS score
Vulnerabilities |
AV |
AC |
PR |
UI |
S |
C |
I |
A |
Score |
Misconfigurations |
Adjacent Network |
Low |
Low |
None |
Changed |
High |
High |
High |
8.4 |
Flaws in network |
Network |
High |
High |
None |
Changed |
High |
High |
High |
8 |
Buffer overflow |
Local |
low |
Low |
None |
Unchanged |
None |
Low |
High |
7.8 |
Hardcoded or weak Credentials |
Adjacent Network |
Low |
Low |
None |
Unchanged |
High |
Low |
Low |
6.8 |
Cross-Site Scripting |
Network |
Low |
Low |
Required |
Changed |
High |
High |
High |
9 |
The Cross-Site Request Forgery |
Network |
Low |
None |
Required |
Unchanged |
High |
High |
High |
8.8 |
Cleartext Transmission |
Adjacent Network |
Low |
High |
None |
Unchanged |
High |
High |
None |
6.5 |
Zero Day |
Adjacent Network |
High |
Low |
None |
Unchanged |
High |
High |
High |
8.1 |
Table 2. Threats with their associated CVSS score
Threats |
A V |
A C |
P R |
U I |
S |
C |
I |
A |
score |
Denial of Service (DoS) attack |
Network |
High |
None |
None |
Changed |
Low |
High |
High |
8.9 |
Phishing attack |
Adjacent Network |
High |
Low |
Required |
Changed |
High |
High |
Low |
8.3 |
Malware and worms’ infections |
Local |
Low |
None |
Required |
Changed |
High |
High |
None |
8.2 |
Virus Infection |
Adjacent Network |
Low |
None |
Required |
Changed |
High |
High |
None |
8.5 |
Escalation of privilege |
Adjacent Network |
High |
Low |
None |
Changed |
High |
High |
High |
8 |
Eavesdropping |
Network |
High |
High |
Required |
Unchanged |
High |
High |
Low |
7.9 |
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) |
Network |
High |
Low |
None |
Changed |
High |
High |
High |
8.5 |
Data tampering or Spoofing |
Adjacent Network |
High |
High |
Required |
Unchanged |
High |
High |
Low |
7.5 |
Indenting to evaluate the threats above, we will be using the CVSS calculator to assign severity scores to the threats, we used the same metrics as in section 3.1, and we recorded the results in Table 2.
3.3 Business impacts
In cybersecurity, Impact refers to the potential for loss, harm or pulverization of resources or information in a company. It can be caused by a vulnerability being exploited or an attack that occurs. There are many types of impacts, such as:
Those impacts are related directly to one of those three aspects: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. These are the three center components of the CIA set of three, a data security demonstrate implied to direct an organization’s security methods and arrangements.
3.4 Security standards
Cyber security standards are methods laid out in published documents that endeavor to ensure the cyber environment of a client or an organization. This environment includes users, systems, networks, tools, applications, and data that can be connected directly or indirectly to networks [36]. The main purpose is to diminish the risks that can be endured from cyberattacks. These documents comprise of tools, policies, concepts, guidelines, training, best practices and technologies.
Some of the most relevant standards are described below. These are security standards that can be adopted in the industrial context and can be applicable to various assets:
After listing the most common vulnerabilities and the potential threats in a CIM Context, we will elaborate a list of directives that could help counter them or minimize their risks. In this section we will project the five security Standards on BLAEM, so that we can come up with the technical best practices that can be applied to our architecture when being implemented. To do so, we will start by listing all the possible assets we will be dealing with in our architecture Guidelines:
4.1 Cyber security guidelines for BLAEM
After analyzing the standards listed above, those are the guidelines that we assume could help protect our architecture
A Regular and well conducted audit can help detect configuration, data issues, and also common vulnerabilities such as Zero-days, Cross- Site Scripting and Cross-Site Request Forgery. Moreover, it gives the company the upper hand against critical threats such as Denial of Service attacks, infections, Advanced Persistent threats, Data tampering and Eavesdropping.
In Table 3 we listed all the guidelines, and we specified for each guideline the list of threats it can cover and the vulnerabilities it can fix, this specification has been done based on the cyber-security standards and technical experimentations [43].
Based on the scores associated to each threat from Table 2, we calculated a threat Score (St) for each guideline (The sum of the scores for all the threats covered by the guideline). For example, the guidelines Encryption helps to avoid Data tampering, Eavesdropping, Advanced Persistent Threat and Phishing attacks. And from Table 2, we have a score associated to each of those threats which is:
St = 7.5 + 7.9 + 8.5 + 8.3 = 32.2
The same logic goes for vulnerabilities to calculates the Sv.
5.1 Elaborating the index
To appraise the safety of BLAEM, we emphasized on the security aspect. Thus, based on a list of standards, we shaped up a set of guidelines that we will follow in our design and implementation.
To evaluate the implementation of BLAEM from a safety point of view, we propose an index that will enable the company to assess its implementation using a quantitative indicator. The index will allow us to evaluates the implementation of BLAEM using quantitative indicator, it will be calculated based on the implemented directives listed above, the more the guidelines are being respected and applied, the more the index will be high which means that the implementation is well secured. This index will be based on the 14 directives listed above and will be defined in three steps.
1) A score will be associated to each guideline, based on the threats it can protect from and the vulnerabilities it helps fix and it shall be calculated using the following formula:
$S g=0.1 * \sum_{i=1}^n S t_i+0.1 * \sum_{j=1}^m S v_j$
$\{1 \leq i \leq n$ and $1 \leq j \leq m$ and $i, j \in \aleph\}$
where,
2) The calculation is done using data from Table 1 for the vulnerabilities scores and Table 2 for the threats scores. The result can be found in table
The architecture security index is calculated based on the scores associated to the guidelines that has been applied.
$\begin{gathered}I_S=\sum_{i=0}^P S g_i \\ \{1 \leq i \leq p \leq 14 \text { and } i \in \aleph\}\end{gathered}$
where, p is the number of applied guidelines. Its value is 0 if no security guidelines are applied in the architecture and 14 if all the guidelines are applied.
The index value range is 0 to 60, with 60 being the sum of the scores for all the 14 guidelines.
3) A gauge shall be defined with a scale from 0 to 60. To evaluate the security index, we will define 3zones in the gauge based on 2 thresholds:
As shown in Figure 2, we dedicated 60% of the gauge to unsecured Zone, in order to push companies to apply the maximum number of guidelines all scores combined. This choice is also motivated by the fact that reaching an acceptable level of security is not a light task.
The same thing goes for the second zone that covers 25% of the gauge, which would push companies into implementing more guidelines in order to achieve a high security level.
Figure 2. Security index gauge
5.2 Case study
To give a concrete example of the usage of the Index, we are going to simulate a case study from the automotive industry. This one consists of a firm that possesses two factories, the first one located in Nantes, and the second one in Houara.
For the first factory, we can count four production work centers, with a PLC for each, three printers and five workstations. For the second factory, we define five work centers, besides the PLC that all the machines got, the work centers are equipped with sensors for efficient data collect, those machines are controlled by an MES installed on ten work station in the local level is insured by using separated systems and networks for the two plants, besides controlling the traffic in the network. The Servers and the work centers are highly secured using identity management, a strong account management policy and an up-to-date policy. A technical audit is planned regularly to ensure that everything is in order.
The data is Secured using encryption algorithms, and a decentralization policy, Backup servers are in place to ensure the availability of the data in the assets.
In this implementation, we applied the following security guidelines: Control access points, Network segregation, Account management, Backup and restoration, Up-to-date management, Encryption, Technical Audit, Data decentralization, Traffic control and analysis,
From Table 3, we can retrieve the Guideline Score (Sg) associated to each guideline.
The security index for this implementation shall be counted as follow: Is = 2.5 + 3.3 + 2.9 + 3.2 + 6.8 + 3.9 + 9.7 + 3.1 + 4.2 = 39.6, the index is located in the range between 36 to 51. Se we can conclude that the implementation has been done properly and the security Index is acceptable.
Table 3. Guidelines score calculation
Guideline |
Threats |
St |
Vulnerabilities |
Sv |
Sg |
Technical Audit |
|
49 |
|
47,6 |
9,7 |
Up-to-date management |
|
34,1 |
|
33,9 |
6,8 |
Configuration solidifying |
|
24,8 |
|
32,3 |
5,7 |
Traffic control and analysis |
Advanced Persistent Threat
|
25,2 |
|
16,4 |
4,2 |
Warnings Monitoring |
Malware and Worms
|
25 |
|
15,6 |
4,1 |
Encryption |
|
32,2 |
|
6,5 |
3,9 |
Isolation and zoning |
|
17,4 |
|
16,4 |
3,4 |
Separation of environments |
|
24,8 |
|
8,4 |
3,3 |
Network segregation |
|
16,7 |
|
16,4 |
3,3 |
Controllers safety |
|
16,4 |
|
15,8 |
3,2 |
Backup and restoration |
|
25,6 |
|
6,5 |
3,2 |
Data decentralization |
|
15,4 |
|
15,2 |
3,1 |
Accounts managements |
|
16 |
|
13,3 |
2,9 |
Control access points |
|
17,2 |
|
8 |
2,5 |
Today, many industrial companies tend to digitize their processes in order to satisfy the customers’ needs and to keep up with the competition. However, the utilization of different systems and technologies within the same environment is a challenging task.
In a previous work, we have proposed a reference architecture for computer integrated manufacturing entitled The Bi-Level Architecture for Efficient Manufacturing (BLAEM), which is able to encompass every system in the CIM context. This architecture is based on the ANSI/ISA-95 standard and takes into account six major perspectives: Data integration, Systems integration, Security, Monitoring & Data analysis, Mobility and finally Cloud computing.
In this paper we focused on the security aspect by presenting the most important vulnerabilities and threats related to our architecture assets and their business impacts on the company. Then, we proposed a set of security guidelines based on the best standards used in industry. Finally, to evaluate the implementation of BLEAM, we proposed a quantitative index calculated based on different security guidelines. We tried to gather many commonly known security standards such as ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST 800-82, etc. and apply their guidelines to our architecture. These guidelines will enable us to appraise the safety of the architecture once implemented. We provided 14 security directives to be applied by the company, and associated a weight to each of them based on the vulnerabilities that can be fixed by the guideline and threats covered by the guideline. The security index is calculated based on the scores of the guidelines put in place. And the security evaluation is done through predefined thresholds.
This index will help companies to assess quantitatively the security level in their architecture, and can be extended in future works, if we take into consideration more security standards, which will result in enlarging the list of guidelines.
In a future work, we will apply our architecture on a real case study, and we will provide quantitative results by calculating the architecture index.
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