From Mobility to Belonging: Social Integration of Zhuang Ethnic Minorities in an Urban Chinese Context

2.1 Migration drivers among ethnic minorities: Push and pull factors

Migration dynamics in rural-urban areas are often characterised by the use of a push-pull factor. Examples of push factors are poor conditions in the home country (e.g., poverty, inability to secure jobs, ineffective infrastructure, etc.), which force people to leave, whereas attractive factors in the destination country (e.g., job opportunities, improved services) are considered pull factors which drive people to migrate. Recent research implies that in the case of ethnic minorities in the country of origin, the push reasons to migrate are commonly affected by structural disadvantages in the native areas, as opposed to the pull reasons [19, 20]. That is, a good portion of the minority migrants remain behind since they are fleeing miseries back home, and not getting lured by the brilliant conditions in the city.

Historically, ethnic minority regions of China (including some areas of Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou (Zhuang), etc.) have been underdeveloped in terms of weak industrialisation, inadequate education and medical services, and geographic distance. The initial conditions of structural disadvantage have significant migration pressures [20]. As an illustration, it is observed that the highest rates of out-migration of minorities are observed in counties with few non-farm jobs and low education levels. On the same note, in Vietnam, it was found that ethnic minorities in the rural mountainous regions move to cities or upland economic areas mainly to avoid poverty in their areas of origin and land scarcity rather than to seek particular attractions in the urban areas [17]. One group of scholars investigated the ethnic minority young people living in the Central Highlands in Vietnam, where education level largely influenced migration motivation (no choice at home) and education level [20]. Push factors may also be environmental stresses; pollution, land degradation, are examples of problems that cause rural families to move in pursuit of a healthier environment [21, 22].

The evidence of these outcomes is that migration among most minorities is not only a choice but a strategic one, a response to the challenging economic conditions at home and not necessarily voluntary in search of urban opportunities. The choice to migrate (Choice) must be usually based on. In the village where one of the interviewees of Zhuang lived, as he noted, there were hardly any jobs; he had no other option but to go out and make some money. This is in line with the rest of the literature: areas of origin that fail to support livelihood necessitate the enticement of migrating as a survival mechanism [23].

The same trend is reflected in comparative cases in the world. The mobility across tribal populations in India has traditionally been low, although following the 2000s, there has been an out-migration of people from villages because of low opportunities in villages. A single study of a tribal community of Tripuri in Tripura found out that on migration, the income increased, but the floating migrants also experienced instability in employment and disadvantages among schooling children, suggesting that it is the push factors (lack of jobs and education locally) that drove them out of the community, but then the floating migrants would encounter challenges in integration in the city [24]. Lack of local opportunities (even as urban demands (jobs, education) also drive these processes) is similarly a source of internal migration between the indigenous groups from rural to the cities in Malaysia [23, 25]. In South Africa, the underdeveloped former homelands migrate into urban areas in search of employment. [26] observe that poverty in the homeland area drives people out, and once at the receiving end, they face barriers to integration, such as access to housing and services.

Thailand and Southeast Asia. In Thailand and cross-border minor migration, push processes are universal. According to studies on the migration of hill tribe minorities and the migrants of nearby countries in Thailand, the push factors are determined by the abject poverty, a lack of land and security in the native lands [22]. Cities may have low wages, but as a contrast to almost zero chances at home, they are decent.

Overall, in different settings, the concept of escape, as a significant theme of ethnic minorities' migration, is noted to be present [11, 27]. Urban glamour does not have much attraction to migrants, and the lack of certain things in their homelands (jobs, stability, prospects) drives them. According to this literature, the first places of appreciation to comprehend the results of integration are that migrants who left their homeland in desperation might enter the city with lower resources and a greater urgency of survival.

Listing these observations, the research project will assume that the decision of the Zhuang migrants to migrate to Guangzhou is largely driven by the push factors such as burdensome financial demands and decreasing livelihood opportunities in Guangxi (the home province). This will be proved in their stories and in the portrait of the sample (e.g., most possess rural origins and provide dependents). This will be analysed in the qualitative findings. Also, the literature suggests that successful integration can be conditional upon the capacity of migrants to compensate for the shortfalls that they bring with them to their home (low human capital, etc.), which can be connected to the interest in education and other variables in integration outcomes.

2.2 Integration outcomes and determinants

Although decisions of migration pre-condition the situation, there are other aspects of the integration of floating migrants into the city of destination. Recent studies have also highlighted the fact that not all forms of integration are automatic and are predisposed or predetermined by different circumstances:

Human capital is repeatedly mentioned as a factor of integration. Skilled and better-educated floating migrants can find more appealing jobs, can better adjust to the culture, and receive information, which helps them to get integrated more easily [24, 28]. A literature review conducted by Lai et al. [29] revealed that low education has a critical impact on the ability of floating migrants to integrate into urban areas since it constrains the migrants to informal jobs and lowers their ability to navigate urban organisations. On the contrary, recent research demonstrates that minority migrants who obtained at least a higher education are more integrated, they earn higher, live better, and report more satisfaction in life in comparison to those with minimal education [30]. The education also increases awareness of the right and access to services, increasing the ability of migrants to use the available resources of the state [30]. Thereby, it is anticipated that education has been of valuable support to the Zhuang migrants, and this renders the program a government initiative which introduces cost reduction in terms of integration. The combination of this literature and the data suggests that the process of integration is not a solitary conflict, but the institutional openness leads to better results among migrants: in cases when cities take inclusive practices, migrant results become better [25] To be an adequate driver of the study (H1) helping Zhuang migrants to do better in terms of their survival (finding better jobs) and wellbeing (increasing their income and gaining confidence) [28, 31].

Age and experience may also play a role in integration, whereby older floating migrants (or those who have been living longer in the city) gain knowledge in urban systems and end up widening their social networks with time. Research into migrant health and migrant integration in China states that migrants become more assimilated with time after experiencing some problems at the beginning. Migrants who are older or migrated earlier tend to show higher integration indicators [31, 32]. As an example, a survey established that the longer the migrant is old, the greater the improvement in the integration score, which is probably because of higher experience in living in the city [32]. This is in line with the hypothesis (H2): age (proxy experience) will positively correlate with integration. In fact, regression analysis is used to see whether old Zhuang migrants possess greater scores in terms of choice and survival, possibly because of skills accumulated and linkages in the host countries. (Strictly speaking, the distinction can be gradual; it does not mean that youth are incapable of a learning experience, but that experience will give them a certain edge).

Structural determinants of integration are often discussed as institutional and policy factors. In China, these are strongly shaped by the hukou system. Many studies describe the rural and urban hukou division as producing a two-tier citizenship structure, in which rural migrants are not treated as full urban residents [33]. Hukou status is closely linked to access to schooling, medical services, affordable housing, and formal employment [34]. Migrants without local urban hukou often face exclusion from basic services or higher access costs, which weakens integration. Recent national evidence also indicates that inequalities in health rights accessibility are associated with lower levels of urban integration among minority rural migrants [23]. In this study, household registration type is included as a key explanatory variable. Hypothesis 3 (H3) expects that institutional restrictions to full urban inclusion will be negatively associated with agricultural hukou status, particularly through well-being outcomes.

Policy support programs can also have an effect on integration besides hukou. China has local initiatives in some of its cities, such as the migration skills training of migrants, migrant children's education, or even community centres to support social inclusion. Literature assessing these is rather limited, but it has been proposed that positive policies and acceptance in the community enhance integration [18, 26]. As an example, Luo et al. [24] maintain that when migrant workers are assisted in reaching urban social organisations and social services, the latter act faster, supporting the integration of migrant workers into the mainstream society. The qualitative results of the government programs of Guangzhou will be observed, such as the labour export services connecting workers in the rural areas with jobs in the city.

Another factor that has been found in the studies is social capital and networks. Jobs and emotional support can be easily offered to floating migrants who have strong ties to their community (i.e., clan networks or associations in the city), thus facilitating the integration process [29]. The shock of the urban transition can be mitigated with co-ethnic networks, which offer information about housing to ethnic minorities, job connections and a sense of belonging. Nonetheless, extreme dependence on ethnic enclaves may as well restrict wider integration, so long as the floating migrants are socially isolated by the host mainstream [14]. Bonding with the fellow migrants (e.g., hometown associations) is typical of the Chinese context; however, the introduction of ties (bridging ties) with the local urban residents is essential to the long-term inclusion [34]. The statistics note that Zhuang migrants mostly interact with other Zhuang or other migrants, which assists in some ways, but does not enhance their stronger assimilation in Guangzhou society [35]. This can be aligned with the results of studies, which claim that the social capital of bonding (connection within the migrant community) is high, and the social capital of bridging (connection to local people) is comparatively low among many migrant groups in China [9]. Social interactions indicators (e.g., main friends circle) were also added to the descriptive analysis to pick up this dynamic, although the main hypotheses are directed to the more quantifiable aspects of education, age and hukou. Recent evidence also shows that social networking sites can support acculturation by helping migrants maintain ties and access information and support in the destination [36].

In light of the above, it is formally stated that the hypotheses to be tested with the quantitative data are:

H1: Educational level relates positively to the social integration outcomes (choice, survival and wellbeing). The Zhuang floating migrants who are well-educated will record better scores on indices of integration when compared to those with lesser education.

H2: Social integration does not have a negative relationship with age. The level of integration amongst older Zhuang migrants (who perhaps possess more experience in their work/life) or those who have lived longer in urban areas will be higher compared to younger migrants.

H3: The hukou status influences the integration of hukou holders significantly: namely, rural (agricultural) hukou status is correlated with decreased integration, particularly, the well-being dimension. Those migrants who had local urban hukou (against none in the sample) would be more integrated.

Both theory and prior empirical evidence guide these hypotheses. The conceptual model in Figure 1 illustrates the framework linking these factors to integration dimensions.

4.1 Migration motivations and facilitators (qualitative findings)

Core Economic Motives and Aspirations: Interviews established that the major driver of the push factor of the Zhuang floating migrants was economic strain back home in conjunction with the attraction of the labour market in Guangzhou. A large majority (20 of 25 interviewed) of the interviewees mentioned income and employment opportunities as their first motivation toward migrating. Some of them had agrarian origins in Guangxi, where the farm revenue was low; hence, there were no non-farm jobs available. To these floating migrants, Guangzhou was a location where they could earn a living. In addition to subsistence, though, a spirit of ambition began to appear: migrants regard the city as a place of personal development and career rise, not necessarily making money. According to one 24-year-old female, she said:

"I never had the opportunity to become more than a farmer or do any odd jobs in my hometown. On arriving in Guangzhou, I was employed as a parcel courier. However, I observed a friend having an opportunity to acquire computer literacy and advance into an office position. That was my inspiration, I would like to walk in her footsteps. That's my goal and motivation." (Case 3, Female, from Guizhou).

This quotation explains why, in addition to the initial economic reason, migrants pursue their career improvement and more ambitious life ambitions once they are exposed to the opportunities of the city (self-realisation). The variety of the economy of Guangzhou presents opportunities for eliminating manual work and the emergence of skilled workers. In fact, a few interviewees expressed that they developed new challenges (e.g. acquiring basic IT skills, not making a living in the factory, and building a small business) that were not only in the financial area but also in the psychological one, satisfaction with progress. The observation implies that pull factors such as professional development opportunities have a significant role in terms of the continued decision by the migrants to remain in the city. The levels of integration also increase as the floating migrants feel more confident not only to survive but to achieve urbanisation goals in the long term.

Another facilitator that was often cited was the encouragement of the local government programs in ensuring that migration is a viable and less risky decision. Around one out of five among the interviewees had obtained employment or training under an organised labour import program. As an instance, a Guangxi lady aged 27 years told:

"I have gotten to know about my present factory employment with the help of the labour export office of my country. They essentially linked us up to employers in the city of Guangzhou. It saved me much hassle in search of employment. The fact that the government was supporting such programs made me realise that going to Guangzhou was a better choice because I would be safer and more secure." (Case 7, Female, from Guangxi).

Besides assisting the floating migrants to get houses immediately they arrived, such institutional support instilled psychological confidence in the migrants. The inclusion of the official channels made it less uncertain and created confidence that they were not going to be abused. Others also said that training programs or recruitment fairs were set up by migrants. The stories above demonstrate that proactive measures (e.g., labour matching, skills workshops, educational aspects of the law) act as facilitators of integration, which essentially eases the process of landing in the city. This is what comparative literature implies: when it is the case that destination cities provide systemic assistance to floating migrants, the migrants can become more competent in their abilities to integrate by feeling more secure and part of the community [23]. Government interventions became both a safeguarding tool (protecting migrants against the most atrocious offences) and an empowering tool (providing a path to further opportunity) in the case [43].

When considered collectively, the qualitative materials on motivations indicate a two-dimensional discourse: The Zhuang migrants are both pressured by what is happening in their homes and driven by the hopes of an actually better future, and the efficient integration becomes achievable by the fact that the latter becomes actually fulfilled in terms of the promises and the support by the institutions in the metropolis.

4.2 Family obligations and hometown constraints

The migration choice of the Zhuang people is strongly entrenched in two mutually supporting push factors, i.e., family monetary strain and hometown structural limitation. These were common themes of the interviews.

The majority of Zhuang migrants have high family orientation cultures, with one of the values being to support their extended family. This pattern is consistent with research on left-behind children in rural China, which highlights persistent educational and caregiving barriers that households attempt to mitigate through migration strategies [44]. The sample size (64 per cent) was married, and a large number had children or ageing parents who relied on them. One of the main drives was the economic need to support the family. A young mother explained:

I could not find any employment back home. The income that my husband earned through farming was not sufficient to support the entire family. There are two little children and his old parents to be considered. We arrived in Guangzhou with one aim in order to get more; however, now we deliver food orders in the city with our own hands". (Case 1, Female, from Gansu).

Another 30-year-old man told such a story:

"I am the only son. The medical costs of my parents are high, and they are ageing. I am in construction during the day and driving ride-share at night... every single dollar I make benefits them (them)". (Case 23, Male, from Guangdong).

These testimonials are important in highlighting that migration is a household strategy of making a living and not an individual pursuit. Zhuang floating migrants are obliged to address their families out of poverty or finance the healthcare and educational expenses of their relatives [43]. The responsibility to care for the aged or the child lies with the family members in rural minority regions that have little or no public welfare. Migration is a resolution to these demands; not to migrate can be to default in his duty as a son/daughter or parent. Therefore, earning money on behalf of the family was not the only economic reason but a moral requirement quoted by interviewees. This type of family-focused push factor has been observed in other literature (e.g., the rural migrants in China in general, family demands are more important than individual ones), and it is especially severe in the case of the minority migrants who come from poor areas where many generations of people depend on migrant remittances [26]. The implication is that migrants come to the city with serious financial pressure, and it may affect their attitude to work and integration (usually, generating income is the highest priority).

The second push factor is that in the community of origin, the hometown Predicament, there is the unavailability of viable opportunities. Most Zhuang are either village or small town inhabitants of Guangxi (and some of Guizhou or Yunnan). The picture that interviewees developed about these places was rather similar: they were underdeveloped economies where subsistence agriculture is prevalent, there are hardly any industries or companies, the infrastructure is lacking, and public services are scarce. One male migrant lamented:

"My home town has very few jobs other than farming. There are very few factories or business ventures where the local youths are employed. You can have a desire to learn something, and you have no place to apply it. There was no option but to relocate to Guangzhou to get a job". (Case 12, Male, from Guangxi).

Another high school graduate explained that even the factory jobs that paid low wages could not be attained in his hometown:

"I do not have anything other than a primary school education, and I am not skilled. In my home country, I could not get good jobs. In my area, factories were few, and whatever opportunity that came would get filled by locals who had contacts... I could not get any chances". (Case 10, Male, from Guangdong).

These testimonies advocate the fact that a single economic system in the rural minority areas, most of the time, mono-crop farming or extracting industries do not create job opportunities among the youth [45]. The level of education and training at local levels is restricted (considering the fact that Case 10 points out that they lack skills and do not have a location to learn them), which makes the problem even worse, and the youths have idle days or do the work that thematises them further. This has seen migration as the only avenue through which one can escape stagnation. The phrases heard many times by the interviewees were, no, but to go out, as their choice to migrate. This is indicative of structural push: even the ones that may have wanted to remain near home were forced to move because there were no opportunities and services (e.g., some claimed that there were no hospitals, and that also caused them to be in a city to get better healthcare access to their family).

In general, these push factors, such as economic responsibility towards the family and the absence of local employment, establish a significant pressure pushing Zhuang to Guangzhou. However, most notably, they predetermine the scenario of integration: migrants come under pressure to make money fast, with the background of low levels of development of human capital. This implies that they tend to get into low-paying jobs within the urban area and are forced to adapt a rural lifestyle to an urban one within a very short period. This interaction preconditions the integration challenges that are reported in the future. In one word, as one of the participants explained, “we come because we must care about the loved ones and we cannot care because we just cannot support our villages.” The literature agrees that such floating migrants do not come to the city as motivated by the urban allure but are forced by the rural challenges, which may shape their city experiences [2].

Before examining the hypothesis tests, a descriptive profile of the Zhuang floating population was presented in the sample, which provides context for their integration status.

The Zhuang migrants are predominantly young, with a mean age of about 28 years, and the largest age cohort is in their early 20s (20 to 24 years, making up 36.6%). The sample is female-majority (55% female vs 45% male), indicating significant female participation in migration. This slight female skew aligns with trends of increasing female rural-urban migration in China, as women often take service jobs in cities. A strong majority (around 74%) are in the 20 to 39 age range, consistent with official data on the youthfulness of migrants.

Nearly two-thirds (73.8%) of the Zhuang migrants are married, while about 23.8% are unmarried (the remainder divorced or widowed). This high marriage rate suggests many are migrating as couples or family units rather than single individuals. Indeed, family households predominate: approximately 73% reported living in family-based arrangements (with spouse and/or children), whereas 27% live in shared or collective setups. The average migrant supports about 1.105 elderly and 2.141 children back home (often these are parents and children left behind), highlighting the earlier point about heavy family obligations.

Educational attainment is low overall. Over one-third (34.6%) of Zhuang migrants in the sample are effectively illiterate or did not finish primary school, and an additional ~35.3% have only a middle school (junior high) education. About 12.6% reached high school, and only 7.5% have any higher education (junior college or above). This distribution starkly contrasts with that of urban natives in Guangzhou and underscores a human capital gap. Such low education levels limit the types of jobs available to these migrants and pose integration challenges (e.g., difficulty navigating bureaucratic procedures, inability to speak Mandarin fluently in some cases). It also justifies the focus on education as a determinant in the regression analysis, since variation in education (though limited at the high end) could significantly stratify integration outcomes.

An overwhelming 93% hold agricultural hukou (rural household registration) and correspondingly about 87.3% migrated from outside Guangdong Province (primarily Guangxi, and some from neighbouring Yunnan or Guizhou). The remaining ~12.7% moved from within Guangdong (likely Zhuang from Guangxi who had already relocated to nearby Guangdong locations, or Zhuang minorities native to Guangdong’s rural areas). Most floating migrants originate from South China (58%) and Southwest China (27%) regions: essentially reflecting Guangxi’s location and some spillover from Yunnan/Guizhou. This confirms that the sample largely comprises cross-provincial migrants adjusting to a new province and often a different linguistic environment (Cantonese in Guangzhou versus Zhuang or Southwestern Mandarin back home).

Consistent with their education, Zhuang migrants predominantly work in blue-collar and service jobs. In the sample, about 44.8% are employed in secondary industries (manufacturing, construction) and 51.5% in tertiary sectors (wholesale/retail trade, hospitality, logistics, domestic work). Very few hold white-collar positions; only 14.8% reported being in professional/technical roles, and a mere 1.1% work as civil servants. The largest specific occupational categories were commercial/service workers (~30%) and production/transportation labour (~26%). Additionally, a number are in informal employment, such as food delivery couriers, ride-share drivers, street vendors: these were captured qualitatively, even if not fully, in the formal survey categories. Such jobs are typically low-paying and unstable, reflecting limited upward mobility so far.

The income distribution is skewed towards low earnings. Over 38% earn below RMB 3,200 per month (roughly USD \$450), and about 50% earn RMB 3,201 to 6,400 (\$450–\$900). Only ~12% earn above RMB 6,400 (>\$900). For context, these figures cluster around or below the official average income levels for urban Guangzhou, indicating that most Zhuang migrants occupy the lower rungs of the urban economy. Their monthly expenditures average around RMB 2,998, with a notable pattern that food expenses exceed housing costs on average: many live in inexpensive shared accommodations, but food and daily necessities still take up a large portion of their budget, leaving little disposable income or savings.

The vast majority of the respondents live in rented private housing, typically in Guangzhou’s “urban villages” or factory dormitories. The average housing situation code (4.038 on a 1 to 5 scale) corresponds to renting a room or apartment in an urban village or peri-urban area. Only a handful have employer-provided dormitory housing or have managed to purchase a home. Housing quality varies, but many described cramped conditions, sharing with other migrants to save on rent. Such living environments, while economical, can limit migrants’ interaction with mainstream urban residents (they often cluster in migrant communities) and affect their comfort and sense of belonging.

Socially, Zhuang floating migrants tend to rely on ethnic or hometown networks. Many reported that their close friends in Guangzhou are “fellow townspeople” (often meaning another Zhuang from Guangxi). This reliance provides emotional support and practical help (e.g., sharing job leads). On the positive side, 58% expressed an intention to remain long-term in Guangzhou (either settling permanently or at least for many more years) as opposed to planning to leave soon. Moreover, respondents generally feel accepted by residents at least to a basic degree: the average self-rated acceptance was above the midpoint. This suggests that outright discrimination may not be commonly felt, though subtle exclusion could still exist. Notably, formal civic participation (such as community meetings or voting in local elections) is essentially nil for migrants without local hukou; none of the respondents was involved in urban governance processes. Their social integration thus happens informally through work and community networks rather than institutional civic inclusion.

In summary, the descriptive profile portrays Zhuang migrants in Guangzhou as a young, family-driven, low-income, and low-educated group, predominantly employed in labour-intensive sectors and living on the margins of the urban economy. They have strong ties to their ethnic community and demonstrate resilience and willingness to integrate (as indicated by intentions to stay and perceptions of acceptance), yet they face clear structural disadvantages. These characteristics provide a backdrop for interpreting the subsequent analytical results. The migrants’ limited education and rural hukou status, in particular, stand out as potential barriers to full integration, whereas their youth and intent to stay could be assets (implying potential to learn and adapt over time). The next part of the results will quantify how these factors actually correlate with integration outcomes in the data.

4.3 Current state of social integration

The data obtained in the surveys were used to calculate the scores of each dimension of social integration (choice, survival, wellbeing) of each respondent. It is based on those descriptive statistics (mean values of key indicators) that summarise the general integration position of the Zhuang migrants and give us an idea of the strengths and weaknesses of their integration relative to each other.

General Characteristics (Context for Integration): The profile of the 260 Zhuang respondents indicates a young workforce with modest formal schooling. Most respondents have completed lower secondary schooling or below, and the average age is in the late twenties. Women constitute a slight majority. Most respondents are married and hold agricultural hukou. A large share migrated with family members, and the mean length of residence in Guangzhou is under four years. The sample also includes a sizeable proportion of cross-province migrants from Guangxi.

Such general characteristics create a difficult position of integration: low education level and rural hukou can be a barrier to economic and social integration, whereas youth and family presence could be more helpful in creating better adaptation by providing support and an extended future time perspective in the urban area.

The distribution of monthly earnings suggests generally limited economic discretion, with most respondents concentrated in the lower income brackets and only a minority reporting higher earnings. Perceived job security is moderate, and many respondents report that household dependency obligations influence migration decisions and constrain flexibility. These patterns indicate that, for many Zhuang migrants, mobility is shaped by a combination of opportunity seeking and necessity-driven constraints rather than unconstrained choice.

Homes are mostly occupied by rented private constructions, with the evidence that the average housing code is 4.038 (4 being the case of the homestead, which are privately rented houses or shops in an urban village or others). This implies that they are sheltered, but it is usually unofficial or employer-anticipated shelter. It also, in most cases, suggests overcrowding, since most rent one room, or even share an apartment, to reduce expenses.

Little participation in any kind of skills training or adult education is very low, with an average of only 0.312 (1 would indicate that they participated in all training, that is, took part in at least one training). This implies that only a small proportion of the migrants (31 per cent) have attended any vocational training programs. Most people have not been given such a chance (or time) to upgrade skills using formal means. This may be because of long working hours, information unavailability or a cost factor. The dismal training adoption rates are evidence of the fact that there is a need to enhance their human capital after migration.

The mean monthly migrant expenditure is Y=2. 998. In this, the statistics show that the average housing costs are less than food costs. Qualitatively, most of the migrants said that they use a significant share of their income to buy food (particularly when they engage in manual labour, which demands hearty meals) and to maintain a very low cost of getting a place (which is achieved by inhabiting less expensive quarters). The Food > housing statistic could also indicate that food > housing among many people who share their housing costs with multiple people. It implies strict budgetary control in terms of which even fundamental needs use the majority of the income, leaving little for savings.

Social Security defines participation in traded social security (pension, medical insurance, and unemployment insurance) as less than desirable; the mean number of types of insurance that migrants subscribe to is 0.802 (out of the five most common types, presumably). Most of them probably have basic medical insurance or none at all. This is due to low enrolment because of the hukou restriction and the type of employment that they are engaged with (most of them are informal or temporary workers, therefore, employers may not enrol them on social insurance, and they cannot easily enrol themselves on the city on their own). It is their safety net is not as strong; in case of illness, injury, or old age, they will not have much support in the city, which may be an impediment to integration and wellbeing in the long term.

All in all, the dimension of survival implies Zhuang migrants living by their wits (sheltering themselves and making ends meet) but with minimal margins. Instead, they survive by living frugally (frugal housing, spending little outside necessity, etc.), and work hard, instead of the supposedly better abilities (acquired by only a small number of people receiving training) or institutional assistance (poor social insurance formulations). Such an unstable mode of survival is a source of stress and vulnerability, and it encourages the significance of factors such as income and education, in the event that they might positively influence this aspect.

Zhuang floating migrants socialise mostly with townspeople (tongxiang) or with their co-ethnic counterparts. This dependence in ethnic networks is qualitatively based and in agreement with numerous migrants seeking solace in people who are in the same language/culture. Although this offers some sense of cohesiveness in the community, it can restrict assimilation with the rest of the society. On the good side, the networks can serve as a support mechanism in order to counter the feeling of loneliness.

Zhuang migrants show a great intention to stay long-term in Guangzhou. The mean intentions to stay were 1.189 on a scale (where 1 equals intends to stay, 0 equals intends to leave). The implication of this is that a large proportion of people view Guangzhou as their new residential place in the foreseeable future. This kind of intention can be viewed as a proxy of potential for integration; migrants who intend to remain tend to invest more in relationships with locals and integrate culturally. It is found in the statistics, hope or devotion to city life in several of the Zhuang.

Migrants in general feel accepted by the inhabitants of the cities. Although this is subjective, the overall picture seen was that local acceptance is a general or moderate (not full assimilation, but not outright rejection) one. Not many interviewees related any cases of discrimination; the majority have experienced that as long as they are diligent and obey the regulations, they get treated decently or at least tolerated by residents. This relatively favourable understanding of acknowledgement is vital to the well-being; psychological incorporation would be greatly debilitated by a sense of not being wanted. Apparently, Zhuang migrants are less apparent, and as a result, they do not experience as severely the dictates of prejudice in Guangzhou as do other minorities (they tend to speak Mandarin, and they are physically indistinguishable to the Han majority, unlike other minorities). Nevertheless, it is also a possibility that has little contact with locals (since they resided in migrant circles), so they have not experienced a lot of friction, which is a two-edged sword to integration.

Overall, Zhuang migrants are characterised by the desire to assimilate, as they have plans to stay longer in the country and seek to acquire a certain degree of social fundability, but are still mostly situated within their ethnic enclaves and not extremely connected with formal urban structures. They are becoming more social towards themselves than to the host community, although there is a willingness to be more of a part of the city based on the appropriate opportunities. This suggests possible policy implications (i.e., community mixing, inclusive community services) that are likely to result in a wider social integration process other than the migrant sub-community.

The Zhuang floating population of Guangzhou is young and family-oriented, with economically active, vulnerable and low-income statuses. They, too, are moderately optimistic and determined to settle, to support themselves by the aid of ethnic networks, and are confronted with evident cracks in the proficiency and institutional assimilation. These results precondition the following inferential analysis, during which the stimulating effect of such factors as education, age, and hukou status on the outcome of integration (choice, survival, wellbeing). In the following section, the results of the regression analysis will be provided to test the hypotheses, and Table 2 will provide the summary of the statistical estimates.

4.4 Determinants of social integration: Regression analysis

Multivariate regressions were conducted to test Hypotheses 1 to 3, with the standardised integration indices serving as dependent variables. Results of three OLS regression equations are reported in Table 2: (1) factors influencing the choice dimension (F1), (2) factors influencing survival (F2), and (3) factors influencing wellbeing (F3). Standardised coefficients are presented with robust standard errors in parentheses and levels of statistical significance indicated.

Table 2. Multivariate regression results for the social integration indices (OLS with robust standard errors)