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The safety assessment of Safety Critical Systems (SCSs) is a challenging task since it involves different actors and a combination of several knowledge domains. This increases the complexity of the integration of safety requirements into the design model. Consequently, there is a need for a shared model with an unambiguous terminology aiming to avoid misunderstandings between both safety and design teams. In this paper, we propose a model-based system engineering approach in order to support the goal-oriented safety reasoning and to provide a common model between both safety and requirement engineering driven by goals. Furthermore, the present study considers the safety rules development process based on the Organization-based Access Control (Or-BAC) model, which is normally used to improve the security of the information systems. Then, the common vocabulary proposed for the inter- pretation of the considered notions of domains is defined. Moreover, safety requirements are expressed with a high level of abstraction according to the required railway knowledge and the requirement trace- ability process is considered through an up-bottom reasoning using the Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams. The proposed approach aims to provide a methodology able to identify safety conditions in order to anticipate risks and to make better safety-related decisions. Finally, the proposed methodology is evaluated through a real accident scenario analysis in order to validate its adaptability to represent real critical situations.
rail accident scenario, design model, dysfunctional analysis, model-based safety engineering, Or-BAC, safety requirements
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