Enhancing Marine Surveillance Governance: The Strategic Role of the Marine and Fisheries Resources Surveillance Unit in Combating Illegal Fishing in Sibolga Waters

2.1 The government's role in monitoring marine resources

A key component of creating a just, sustainable, and flexible governance structure that can respond to global issues is the government's responsibility in managing marine resources. The three primary roles of government are as a facilitator, a dynamicator, and a regulator [23]. As a regulator, the government can create laws, regulations, and standards that apply to all parties involved in the marine and fisheries industry [24]. By promoting active community involvement and launching social change via empowerment, education, and training, the government acts as a dynamic actor [25]. As a facilitator, the government is in charge of establishing the institutional framework, infrastructure, and facilities necessary to assist the accomplishment of maritime development objectives [26].

Given the size of the sea area and the difficulty of its oversight, the central government's participation is crucial in an archipelagic nation like Indonesia. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), a strategic agency of the federal government, is tasked with making sure that the use of marine resources adheres to sustainability standards. As a technical implementing entity, the Marine and Fisheries Resources supervisory entity (PSDKP) is directly involved in putting supervisory policies into practice. The government also acts as a development agent, ensuring that policies are implemented in a way that truly affects the social and economic well-being of coastal communities [27].

The effectiveness of marine resource supervision can be examined using [23] three primary governmental tasks. Table 4 description of these roles that follows demonstrating how each function is represented in the framework of fisheries supervision.

Table 4. The role of government

It is evident from the above chart that the three responsibilities work in tandem to determine the effectiveness of maritime surveillance governance. However, the difficulties of bureaucratic politics, scarce human resources, and unequal incentive distribution at the implementation level have not been specifically taken into account by Sahri et al. [23]'s theory of government responsibilities. In reality, agency relationships, regional political backing, and budgetary frameworks all have a significant impact on how well the three responsibilities are implemented. As a result, to interpret the execution of the roles of regulator, dynamicator, and facilitator, this study will also take into account the local administrative context.

2.2 Concept of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing

The sustainability of coastal economies and marine ecosystems is seriously threatened by IUU fishing. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing are the three damaging behaviors that make up IUU fishing [28]. Falsifying vessel documentation, using restricted fishing gear, violating fishing zones, and fishing by foreign vessels without authorization are all considered forms of IUU fishing in Indonesia [29].

The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries [5] estimates that IUU fishing causes economic losses of up to USD 23 billion per year, demonstrating the significant impact on state revenue and coastal communities' income. In addition, IUU fishing leads to inequity in the fisheries market and harms fish stocks, seagrass beds, and coral reefs. According to Bellanger [30], IUU fishing falls under the category of transnational crimes that call for a multi-sector approach and a cross-country response. IUU fishing contributes to 11-26 million tons of illegal fishing captures annually [18, 31].

This harms many developing nations, particularly those with weak marine monitoring capabilities. Table 5 presents a classification of infringements and their corresponding implications, providing a clearer understanding of the various types of infractions that fall under the umbrella of IUU fishing and their respective impacts.

Table 5. Categorization according to violation type and effect

The foundation for developing focused mitigation solutions is an understanding of this classification. Supervisory organizations like PSDKP can create interventions that are in line with the features of dangers in the field by comprehending the types and effects.

2.3 Maritime surveillance strategy in archipelagic countries

As an archipelagic nation, Indonesia has significant difficulties in keeping an eye on its extensive and enormous marine areas [32]. As a result, the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) system is the method employed in marine surveillance. Three components make up this system: surveillance (direct maritime surveillance), control (administrative control and licensing), and monitoring (fishing activity monitoring). This method heavily relies on technologies like the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) [33].

Orofino et al. [13] demonstrated how the application of VMS technology can enhance transparency in fishermen's reporting and enhance early detection of illicit activity. However, institutional preparedness, human resource capability, and digital infrastructure are critical to this system's success. While the center is in charge of oversight within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Law No. 23 of 2014 gives the provincial government the authority to regulate the sea up to 12 miles [14]. But in reality, the central government still bears the responsibility of oversight because many provinces lack the technical and logistical capabilities [34].

Frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices (RPOA-IUU) are crucial resources for enhancing international and regional collaboration in cross-border surveillance [35]. Given that Indonesia has direct borders with several nations that also have high rates of fisheries breaches, this is extremely pertinent.

2.4 Institutional approach in maritime law enforcement

Strong, well-coordinated institutions are needed for maritime industry supervision and law enforcement against infractions. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries' PSDKP Unit is in charge of conducting supervisory duties in the areas, which include managing legal administration, operating surveillance vessels, and looking into incidents of violations. However, poor cross-sector cooperation and a lack of operational resources can undermine the efficacy of supervision.

PSDKP's stance differs from that of other agencies like Polair and TNI AL, which frequently impedes integrated legal action [36]. The government must actively participate in fleet procurement, boost human resource capacity, and standardize agency regulations to provide effective supervision [37]. The ecological and social justice features of fisheries monitoring should be taken into consideration in addition to the formal institutional aspects [38]. Due to their limited access to safe reporting methods and monitoring equipment, small-scale fishermen are frequently in a more vulnerable position. This disparity could erode public confidence in monitoring organizations and increase the divide between large-scale and small-scale fishing communities.

This study adopts a conceptual framework that positions the central government's role (regulator, dynamic, facilitator) as the cornerstone of the marine surveillance system. It is based on the theory of the role of government and the institutional approach that has been explored. Operational support, including money, personnel, fleet, and technology use, fulfills this function. The involvement of coastal communities and cross-agency coordination has a significant impact on how well supervision is implemented in the regions. The effectiveness of technical units like PSDKP in monitoring illicit, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing operations is influenced by each of these factors [39]. The relationships between the components of the conceptual framework employed in this study are depicted in the following Figure 1.

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Figure 1. Conceptual framework

In addition to providing a theoretical road map for thought, this conceptual framework also forms the foundation for gathering research tools and conducting data analysis. The goal of this research is to give a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of PSDKP institutions at the local level by determining the relationship between the role of the central government, operational assistance, institutional coordination, and the efficacy of oversight. Every component of this framework will serve as a guide for creating a methodical approach that is pertinent to the subject.

In-depth interviews, participant observations, and documentation studies on PSDKP's implementation of IUU fishing supervision in Sibolga City were used to gather field data for this study. The analysis was conducted thematically by referencing the central government's institutional role as a regulator, facilitator, and dynamic, as well as the efficiency of the technical implementing units' implementation of supervision in the regions [23].

4.1 Regulating role

The PSDKP maintains laws in Sibolga waterways using technology-based surveillance, direct field supervision, and sanctions. The Fisheries Vessel Monitoring System (SPKP), when paired with the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), allows for real-time tracking of fishing vessels. SPKP (Sistem Pemantauan Kapal Perikanan), which serves as Indonesia’s Fisheries Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), represents the primary regulatory instrument employed by PSDKP in monitoring fishing activities. However, coverage remains poor since many small-scale vessels are not fitted with the devices, and the number of supervisory officers is limited, resulting in decreased monitoring capability.

Field supervision takes place at multiple levels, including document verification at ports before departure, monitoring during fish landing, and direct patrols at sea. In practice, patrol frequency is minimal because Sibolga has just one surveillance vessel and a small number of active personnel. This situation limits the extent of observation due to the area's high fishing intensity. The Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) structure used by PSDKP in Sibolga is summarized in Table 8 below.

Table 8. PSDKP concept for fisheries supervision (MCS framework)

This circumstance indicates that there has not been sufficient operational capability to support the surveillance plan. The low frequency and scope of patrols create a haven for violators due to the large coverage area and high level of vulnerability to illegal fishing activities. Therefore, for surveillance to function efficiently and sustainably, institutional strengthening such as raising budget allocations, updating the fleet, and adding trained human resources (HR) is required in addition to better technical tactics.

Third, administrative sanctions like warnings and fines are given precedence over criminal law enforcement when it comes to enforcing infractions. This has come under fire since it is thought to have no deterrent impact, particularly when it comes to repeat offenders or major infractions such as using trawls, which are illegal fishing gear. The information below lists instances of illicit fishing that have taken place recently, along with the kinds of penalties that the appropriate authorities have imposed.

In addition to technology and patrols, PSDKP levies penalties on violators. According to records from 2021 to 2024, the bulk of offenses concerned the usage of banned trawl nets. The sanctions imposed were mostly administrative, such as fines or written warnings. The specifics of the infractions and punishments levied are shown below (see Table 9).

Finally, PSDKP conducts coordination with Polairud, TNI AL, and the provincial/district Marine and Fisheries Department. Coordination mainly takes the form of case transfers and occasional joint patrols. Although these efforts show the existence of institutional collaboration, the mechanism for systematic follow-up remains limited, so coordination is still focused on operational rather than evaluative aspects.

Table 9. Violations of illegal fishing in Sibolga, 2021-2024

4.2 The government's dynamist role

In addition to regulatory tasks, PSDKP promotes community engagement in surveillance efforts. Several procedures have been devised to incorporate local players, such as public reporting channels and community-based monitoring groups (POKMASWAS). POKMASWAS (Kelompok Masyarakat Pengawas), or Community-Based Fisheries Surveillance Groups, are established in Sibolga to involve local fishers in monitoring and reporting illegal fishing practices.

Public reporting services are provided on a variety of platforms, including the national complaint website (lapor.go.id), WhatsApp, e-mail, and direct office submissions. These channels are intended to allow for faster reporting of potential infractions while also protecting reporters' confidentiality. Despite the range of possibilities, use remains low since community members rarely submit problems directly through these channels.

PSDKP also promotes the formation of POKMASWAS, which serve as early warning organizations in coastal areas. In Sibolga, three groups are legally registered and active, as shown below (see Table 10).

Table 10. Sibolga City POKMASWAS list

These three groups represent the government's efforts to expand surveillance coverage to locations that are not easily accessible by official patrols. They also serve as local middlemen, connecting fishermen with the supervisory agency. Overall, while institutional tools for public participation exist, actual community engagement in Sibolga remains low, as seen by the small number of current reports and the restricted visibility of POKMASWAS operations.

4.3 The central government's facilitating role

The federal government, through PSDKP, also contributes to the development of a more sustainable fisheries system by giving operational support and infrastructure to fishing villages. This responsibility is evident in three major areas: improving surveillance fleets and technology, assisting with fishing equipment and manufacturing facilities, and developing fisheries infrastructure.

Fleet improvement is accomplished by providing patrol boats and utilizing Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) technology to track vessel movements in real time. These procedures are intended to improve the detection of infractions, particularly those happening in restricted fishing zones. However, the number of patrol boats and field workers remains restricted, limiting the scope of monitoring activities.

The provision of environmentally friendly fishing gear and facilities, such as cold storage units, helps to boost production. The goal is to lessen reliance on damaging instruments like trawl nets while increasing the quality of fish capture. Access to these facilities, however, varies by local fishing community.

In addition, the government helps to construct fisheries infrastructure, such as fish auction sites (TPI) and fishing ports. TPI (Tempat Pelelangan Ikan), or Fish Auction Place, functions as both an economic hub for fish distribution and a regulatory mechanism to improve transparency in fisheries governance. These facilities serve commercial and regulatory purposes by boosting catch distribution efficiency, keeping the cold chain intact, and increasing transparency in the local fisheries market. The application of these facilitation roles is described below (see Table 11).

Table 11. Synopsis of PSDKP facilitators' function in Sibolga City fisheries supervision and empowerment

These facilitation efforts show that beyond law enforcement, the government also supports the operational and economic activities of fishermen. The combination of patrol vessels, production assistance, and fisheries infrastructure reflects the government’s attempt to integrate surveillance with empowerment initiatives in Sibolga.

According to the study's findings, the Marine and Fisheries Resources Surveillance Unit (PSDKP) in Sibolga performs three primary functions: facilitator, dynamic actor, and regulator. However, each of these functions is constantly constrained. Inadequate fleets and manpower limit regulatory efforts through SPKP/VMS and patrols, while administrative methods continue to dominate sanctions with little deterrent impact. Low trust and symbolic engagement hinder the dynamic role of involving communities through POKMASWAS groups and complaint channels. Although it shows official support, the facilitative role, which includes the provision of patrol boats, fishing gear, cold storage, and auction facilities, is still not uniformly dispersed.

The report synthesizes these results and suggests a four-pillar architecture for sustainable and adaptable surveillance: inclusive infrastructure, institutional capacity, technology, and community participation. This framework supports regional initiatives against IUU fishing under the RPOA-IUU as well as Indonesia's reform of fisheries governance. By guaranteeing that resource exploitation continues to be permitted, disclosed, and controlled, it also strengthens commitments to SDG14.4.