Game Theory-Based Supplementary Collection Strategy for Industrial Buyers in a Local Agricultural Biomass Market

Game Theory-Based Supplementary Collection Strategy for Industrial Buyers in a Local Agricultural Biomass Market

Jinling SunJuan Pang 

School of Economics and Management, Management Science, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou 730050, China

Corresponding Author Email: 
563521092@qq.com
Page: 
260-274
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.18280/ama_a.540210
Received: 
10 May 2017
| |
Accepted: 
23 May 2017
| | Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

To disclose the mechanism of supplementary collection strategy for industrial buyers in a local agricultural biomass market, this paper presents a framework of the economic behaviors, goals and interests of stakeholders in the market, including investors, industrial buyers and so on, and applies the game theory to investigate the willingness of the supplier and the buyer to seek strategies for common interests. In the supplementary collection strategy, special emphasis was laid to the sustainability of biomass supply. It is discovered that a buyer can reap more profits through the supplementary collection strategy; owing to the long transport distance, however, the strategy fails to achieve highly efficient biomass utilization.

Keywords: 

Material competition, Agricultural residues, Game theory, Biomass.

1. Introduction
2. Model Construction
3. Game Equilibria and Conditions
4. Downstream Competition Analysis
5. Conclusions
  References

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