Modéliser les interactions entre agents : un prérequis pour analyser l’éthique des systèmes complexes

Modéliser les interactions entre agents : un prérequis pour analyser l’éthique des systèmes complexes

Robert Demolombe  

Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse (collaborateur extérieur)

Corresponding Author Email: 
robert.demolombe@orange.fr
Page: 
683-703
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3166/ria.32.683-703
Received: 
|
Accepted: 
|
Published: 
31 December 2018
| Citation
Abstract: 

Ethical rules applied to complex systems, such as weapons systems involving drones, require a detailed analysis of the interactions between the agents. These rules involve institutional, human, software and hardware agents. Their interactions involve causality, influence and relationships between human tutional. Starting from examples, these notions are analyzed informally then formalized in modal logic. This formalization highlights different rules of reasoning which are often confused: the reasoning on the logical consequence, the reasoning on causality and influence, and the reasoning on the relations between institutional agents’ actions and actions of agents acting on their behalf. This formalization can help to design consistent ethical rules.  

Keywords: 

agents, causality, influence, ethics, modal logic

1. Introduction
2. Analyse semi-formelle
3. Formalisation
4. Relations avec d’autres travaux
5. Conclusion
Remerciements
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