Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Immigration and Developers: A Case Study of Hydropower Development Project

Evolutionary Game Analysis Between Immigration and Developers: A Case Study of Hydropower Development Project

Sheng Zeng Jingyu Jin 

School of Finance and Fiscal Affairs, Chongqing Technology and Business University, People’s Republic of China

Page: 
154-163
|
DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2495/SAFE-V4-N2-154-163
Received: 
N/A
|
Accepted: 
N/A
|
Published: 
30 June 2014
| Citation

OPEN ACCESS

Abstract: 

Hydropower is a clean renewable energy because of rich water resources and great potential for its development in our country. Game payoff matrix between immigration and developers of hydropower development project shows that the best stable points or strategies is the dual high cost between immigration and developers of hydropower development project, which makes sure the success of hydropower development project. Our suggestion is improving immigrants’ compensation system to achieve the harmonious development between hydropower development project and society, broadening the fi nancing channels of hydropower development project, strengthening the government support and management of hydropower development, and promoting the orderly development of hydropower projects.

Keywords: 

developers, evolutionary game, hydropower development, immigration

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